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With 68.5 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, on-the-ground evaluation of policy-level 
decisions is crucial for developing sustainable frameworks. To do so, we must engage the voices 
of refugees whose daily life is shaped by state bureaucracy and procedures. My case studies of 
Bhutanese refugees in Pittsburgh and Syrian refugees in Berlin investigate the subjectivity of 
refugees. Data from this ethnography indicate that this subjectivity emerges from the intersection 
of a state’s imposed subjectification and a refugee’s agency to replicate, appropriate and resist 
such institutional subjectification. Regarding the former, refugee-receiving nations envision a 
particular future for refugees within their borders, embodied in a multi-dimensional 
subjectification. I focus on three dimensions of subjectification: how refugees are expected to 
relate to the state (citizen figure), to the economy (laborer figure), and to society (neighbor figure). 
Refugee agency, a reality often overlooked in the bureaucratized refugee regime, shapes how 
individuals replicate, appropriate, and resist such subjectification. I addressed this intersection of 
the institution and the individual through 22 interviews and over 300 hours of participant 
observation at local refugee-serving non-profits in Pittsburgh (2017) and Berlin (2017, 2018). I 
argue that US policy emphasizes training refugees to become self-sufficient laborers, 
complemented by non-demanding citizens and inconspicuous neighbors. German policy 
prioritizes a dependent citizen, complemented by the skilled laborer and multicultural neighbor 
figures. In both Pittsburgh and Berlin, interviewed refugees replicate the principally desired figure 
while appropriating and resisting secondary expectations. Yet in both cases, the primary economic 
or political condition that is most uncertain in a refugee’s life is reflected exactly in the principle 
 v 
figure encouraged by the federal framework, thereby incentivizing refugees to inhabit a precarious 
subjectivity. States compel refugees to strive for the fulfillment of a particular figure without 
facilitating its actualization. This contradiction perpetuates the precarity of displacement and fails 
to provide a durable solution.  
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Preface 
Musa used to stand on a mountain of rubble and watch the other kids walk to school, wishing he 
could join them again. As an Afghan refugee in Iran, he was denied an education beyond age 12. 
I met him while interning at a non-profit in Berlin two summers ago. He had arrived in Germany 
with his mother and brother a few months prior. In that short time, he had taught himself both 
German and English with the aspiration of becoming a dentist. I tutored him in English every 
day. Then, while the asylum requests of his mother and brother were approved, his was rejected. 
He appealed for over a year, impressing the judge when he spoke for himself in court. Yet 
according to the law, the judge says, his asylum will still be rejected. 
  
As the daughter of German immigrants, to me borders used to signify visiting relatives abroad 
and collecting stamps in my passport. Working with refugees in the US, Spain, and Germany, 
though, gave me sobering insight into the reality of demarcation. Borders are a prize fought over 
for power and capital. They are a shoreline asylum seekers risk life to reach. Borders can deny 
one’s nationality and home. Borders criminalize humans and humanity. Engaging with 
individuals for whom these statements are a reality compelled me to address forced migration not 
merely as a humanitarian crisis (two problematic words in and of themselves), but an academic 
imperative. 
 
I express genuine thanks to the many individuals who made my first substantial contribution to 
this field possible.  
 
I thank the many refugees who welcomed me into their home—be it a shipping container, a 
classroom, or an apartment. Thank you for patiently teaching me my first Arabic phrases, 
demonstrating the steps of Kurdish dances, and inviting me to share meals with you and your 
families. Above all, thank you for trusting me with your stories.  
 
Thank you to the non-profit organizations in Pittsburgh and Berlin who welcomed me as an 
intern, volunteer, and researcher.  
 
Thank you to my thesis committee—Dr. Tomas Matza, Dr. Georgina Ramsay, Dr. Heath Cabot, 
Dr. Martha Terry—for your encouragement, expert insight, and commitment to this process and 
lengthy thesis. Special thanks to my primary advisor, Dr. Matza, for introducing me to 
ethnography in my freshman year, trusting me to assist and learn through your project, and 
supporting all my research endeavors since. I am extremely grateful for your guidance in helping 
me develop as a student and researcher.    
 
A deep thank you to my family. The value of your constant encouragement, love, understanding, 
and enthusiasm for my work is indescribable.  
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1.0 Introduction  
The Refugee Welcome Office1, a local non-profit supporting refugees in Berlin, was hosting 
another neighborhood viewing for the 2018 World Cup. I would often attend, and was usually the 
only German in the room. The Syrian fathers and students with whom I watched tuned into the 
German channel, frantically switching to an Arabic one only when the German stream lagged. 
During halftime, everyone stepped outside. I stayed inside as the German news update 
automatically came on. Looking to the left, I saw a group Syrian refugees gathered by the door—
talking, laughing, taking a smoke break, and trying out a donated desk for size. Looking to the 
right, I saw a screen projecting the images of conservative Interior Minister Seehofer and 
Chancellor Merkel debating ‘Fluechtlingspolitik’ (refugee policy). I saw the discourse and its 
subjects side by side, yet unequivocally detached. In seeming indifference to the rhetoric, the 
refugees paid no attention to the debate, filtering in again only once an orchestral crescendo 
marked the end of a commercial break and a return to the game.  
This moment from the summer of 2018 captures four key actors in refugee settlement: 
global phenomena shaping the interests of nation-states, national governments mandating policies, 
local organizations enforcing them, and refugees themselves existing at a juncture of all the former. 
The scene also highlights a disconnect between the policy makers, enforcers, and target population. 
Dorji, a refugee from Bhutan in Pittsburgh, explains: 
There are parts…the government is one part, the agencies are another part. And the  
individuals are one part. So the individual is here at the bottom, they don’t know all these  
things that are going on, how the welfare department is assisting them—Medicare, food  
                                                 
1 I have used pseudonyms for all organizations and informants. The gender of some informants has been changed for 
anonymity. In some instances I have lightly edited statements for clarity. 
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stamps, SNAP card. They have no idea. 
   
Dorji’s reflection indicates a separation of institutions and individuals. The refugee, he 
describes, is at the bottom of a hierarchy—unaware of the policies and procedures affecting his 
daily needs, such as food and healthcare.  
Liisa Malkki (1996) likewise highlights the disconnect between institutions and individuals 
in her aptly entitled essay “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and 
Dehistoricization.” Conducting research among refugees from Rwanda and Burundi living in 
Tanzania, Malkki noted the homogenizing effect of bureaucratic humanitarian interventions. 
Rather than being seen as an individual, refugees caught in the system are dealt with as “pure 
victims in general: universal man, universal woman, universal and, taken together, universal 
family” (378). This reductionism delegitimizes the refugee’s individual voice and story. Malkki 
argues that these populations have “a peculiar kind of speechlessness in the face of the national 
and international organizations whose object of care and control” (386).  Challenging this 
disconnect, Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017) affirm the need to explore the role of each actor, 
arguing that “a more comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the global refugee regime 
must include an account of the diverse actors and forms of power present in institutional contexts 
at the global level, and implementation contexts at the local level” (8). 
To that end, this thesis explores each set of actors to understand how refugee resettlement 
and integration are structured to shape a multi-dimensional refugee subjectivity. Institutional 
actors define subjectification because they create and enforce policies that impact a refugee’s 
livelihood and place in society. Among other functions, migration policy is a mechanism by which 
refugees are trained to reproduce a particular figure that prioritizes and enacts different dimensions 
of subjectivity. I focus principally on the type of laborer, citizen and neighbor refugees are 
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expected to become. These figures refer to the ways in which a refugee is expected to relate to the 
government, workforce and society. The idea that institutional practices create circumstances to 
enforce ideal refugee figures in society indicates that refugees are compelled to become ‘normal’ 
citizens. Their refugee status is an abnormality to overcome, and any subjectification they may 
have known from their country of origin is deemed incompatible. This introduces the debate of 
whether assimilation, integration, or inclusion is most appropriate goal of a federal resettlement 
framework. This thesis will not further explore this particular question; additional insight on 
refugee exceptionalization and the question of citizenship can be found in Arendt’s (1943) essay 
“We Refugees” and the works of Agamben.  
Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017) call the characterization of figures (subjectification) 
productive power—the “production of subjects through diffuse social relations” (11). A nation, for 
example, wields productive power when it creates and enforces policy that confine refugees to a 
particular livelihood and place in society. Understanding this productive power is crucial for 
defining a national framework’s model refugee figure, particularly because such rhetoric is both 
conspicuous and pervasive.  
Refugees reproduce, resist, and appropriate institutional subjectification. As Butler (1997: 
cover) writes, subjectification “consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse 
we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency” and “signifies the process 
of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject.” It involves both 
mastery and subordination. I thus pay special attention to refugee agency, the second aspect of 
multi-dimensional subjectivity. Agency shapes the ways in which refugees subordinate themselves 
to top-down expectations, appropriate them for their own ends, or resist such characterization all 
together. Cabot (2013), for example, highlights the “social aesthetics” involved in the process of 
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determining client eligibility at an NGO supporting asylum seekers in Greece. Asylum seekers’ 
subordination, reshaping, and resistance of the figuration of a deserving recipient of aid underscore 
their agency in a system that expects vulnerability and victimization.  
Migration studies must thus acknowledge refugee agency and engage refugees as active 
participants rather than passive subjects. Incorporating refugee voices and experiences as a primary 
component of analysis shifts the forced migration discourse from representation, whereby 
discussion about the refugee is confounded with dialogue for the refugee (Gatrell 2013), towards 
participation. Dykstra-DeVette (2018) likewise argues for the centrality of refugee voices, 
maintaining that a “lack of rhetorical agency, or the ability to communicate otherwise, impacts 
refugees’ lives…. In the ongoing production of empowered refugee subjectivity, agency (or the 
lack thereof) in self-presentation is a material rhetoric that can have significant and continual 
impact on resettlement” (188).  
Mapping the ability of different actors to enact or be shaped by productive power fosters 
comparison between the creation, implementation, and ramification stages of policy. It also 
allows for an analysis of policy processes in different national contexts (Milner and 
Wojnarowicz 2017). The case studies of this thesis illustrate how contemporary responses to 
forced migration have differentially taken shape. Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017:13) conclude 
that “as global refugee policy is implemented, local dynamics intersect, influence, and shape 
what a policy actually achieves in practice. This is where a gap emerges between the global 
prescribed intent of the policy and the change it actually makes in the lives of refugees.”  
Thus, this thesis explores the intersection of global refugee policy with other global, 
national, and local dynamics in the United States (US) and Germany. These are two important 
global powers and refugee-receiving states that exemplify two of the three durable solutions 
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proposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The first resolution is 
“voluntary repatriation”, in which refugees return to their country of origin. In the second 
solution, refugees remain in their country of asylum (“local integration”). Finally, refugees may 
also be resettled from their country of asylum into a third country (“resettlement”) (UNHCR). 
These solutions only specify the geographic location of refugees: home country, asylum country, 
or third country. Refugee receiving nations have relative freedom to design the subsequent 
integration or resettlement framework that impacts the daily lives of refugees. Thus, it is these 
systems that must be examined to evaluate durability. To understand the rationale and outcome 
of the resettlement framework in the US and integration framework in Germany, I ask the 
following questions: How do global regimes intersect to shape national refugee policy and 
thereby refugee subjectification? How does national policy compel local organizations to enforce 
expected refugee figures relating to the political, economic, and societal spheres? And finally, 
how do refugees employ agency to reproduce, appropriate, and resist this subjectivity? In short, I 
explore what future the nation envisions for refugees, and how refugees have responded.  
I ask and will address these questions in the presented order precisely because it mirrors 
the insertion of refugees into existing frameworks. Each chapter reflects the reality that refugee 
voices come last. This organization is thus an intentional analytical approach to illustrate the 
implication of refugee regimes and discourse that precede the human being.  
I begin in chapter 2 on the global scale. Forced migration cannot be understood as solely a 
problem of the nation-state. Factors such as state repression, violent conflict, and deprivation of 
basic necessities, even when confined within a state’s borders, are invariably global once 
individuals flee across borders (Boswell 2003). Moreover, transnational organizations, primarily 
the United Nations (UN) today, have worked to coordinate state responses. The 1951 Refugee 
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Convention, a UN multilateral treaty, outlines the international cooperation measures, such as 
granting asylum, resettling refugees, and providing financial support (Betts 2010).  
A signatory nation’s (non-binding) obligation to this agreement intersects with national 
interests related to globalization, such as security, economic competition, and cultural 
preservation. This complex juncture shapes a nation-state’s asylum policies. 
In turn, nation-state policy priorities play a significant role in shaping the practices of local 
organizations. Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017:13) argue that “given the highly institutionalized 
nature of the making of global refugee policy, only a limited number of actors, namely states 
belonging to ExCom and UNHCR, participate in this process. Other actors, including NGOs and 
refugees, are not able to participate directly in the formal and informal process.” Local non-profits 
thus often enforce national policies without having a significant say in their development.  
This power dynamic between federal and local entities is mirrored in the relationship 
between local organizations and refugees. Federal policies are aimed at creating particular refugee 
subjects. This strategic framework is imposed on and enforced by local organizations. On-the-
ground implementation of state-level policies, though often framed through a humanitarian lens, 
thus contribute to perpetuating a particular refugee subjectification. Anthropologist Aihwa Ong, 
for example, explores “institutional policies, processes, practices, and actors that not only offer 
assistance and resources but also serve in the production of American subjects” (Benson 
2016:526). This perpetuation of refugee subjectification allows the national border to pursue a 
refugee long after he or she has crossed it. Fassin (2011:215) claims the border has “imposed its 
presence on social relations.” Rather than merely a physical barrier, the border shapes a refugee’s 
daily life by regulating their relation to the state, economy and society. As Fassin (2011:215) 
describes, “[Refugees] cross borders to settle in a new society and discover boundaries through 
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the differential treatment to which they are submitted.” This differential treatment continues even 
as they become fellow residents, co-laborers, and neighbors within a host country (Fassin 2011). 
These figures correlate to three significant relations in which an individual engages: to the 
government, economy, and society.  
Since policy shapes such fundamental relations of life, a refugee’s experience must become 
a crucial part of policy evaluation. Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017:9) argue: “Indeed, critical 
migration and citizenship scholars have demonstrated the benefits of using the perspective of 
refugees and migrants as an entry point to interrogate the functioning of global regimes, especially 
when understanding manifestations of power, resistance, and contestation in the local context.”  
To understand the juncture of global and national power at the local and individual level, 
this thesis is rooted in ethnographic engagement with both refugees and staff at non-profits in 
Pittsburgh and Berlin. It specifically investigates the dimensions of refugee subjectification 
pertaining to a refugee’s expected engagement with the government, workforce, and society. I 
heuristically refer to these as the citizen, laborer, and neighbor figures. I argue that, in the United 
States, emphasis is placed on training refugees to become hardworking, self-sufficient laborers in 
order to be non-demanding citizens and assimilated neighbors. This was manifest in limited state 
support. If a refugee fails to achieve self-sufficiency, he must rely on his social network or 
voluntary community assistance. The German case evidences a different combination 
emphasizing a dependent citizen complemented by the skilled laborer and multicultural neighbor 
figures. Federal policy mandates a high degree of state involvement to ensure linguistic and 
cultural integration, as well as dependence on the state. If a refugee evidences commitment to 
integration by attending language and orientation courses, he is supported by the government and 
does not need charity.  
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1.1 Methods 
To investigate refugee subjectivity and sustainable livelihoods in the resettlement and integration 
durable solutions, I designed case studies in the US and Germany. I conducted ethnographic 
research at two local refugee-serving non-profits: the City Service Center (CSC) resettlement 
agency in Pittsburgh (2017) and the Refugee Welcome Office (RWO) in Berlin (2017, 2018). 
Globally-informed national policies, local enforcement, and the refugee experience intersect at 
these sites. Conducting ethnography at these two sites in Pittsburgh and Berlin lends insight into 
how transnational processes have differentially shaped refugee lives at the state and local levels. 
Ethnography through participant observation and semi-structured interviews helps catch a glimpse 
of the everyday life of refugees caught up in these bureaucratic webs.  
The CSC was one of three resettlement agencies in Pittsburgh at the time of interviews 
(January – March 2017). I had initially been in contact with a different resettlement agency but 
was ultimately not able coordinate with the staff to schedule an interview. I had reached out via 
email four days after the Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States was issued on January 27, 2017. The order suspended for 120 days the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program. Indeed, the staff member with whom I was initially in contact 
responded to my request stating that “it is not business as usual as a result of the executive order.”  
Since I was unable to re-establish contact with the first agency, I turned to the CSC in mid-
February, whose staff agreed to participate in interviews. Resettlement is only one aspect of the 
CSC’s activities. Other primary activities include support for seniors and individuals with 
disabilities. Within its refugee resettlement program, the CSC provides basic services including 
safe and affordable housing with essential furnishings, bureaucratic assistance for obtaining social 
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security cards or school enrollment, employment service and job training, and a cultural 
orientation.   
The office is not located downtown, but rather in a peripheral neighborhood of the city. 
When I arrived at the correct street on an unusually warm February day, I noticed that the CSC 
contained a number of doored offices and rows of cubicles, a waiting area, and a conference room. 
I interviewed two staff members, Jane and Kate. The interviews were each an hour long; I audio-
recorded the conversations and took additional jot notes in a notebook. While settling in for the 
second interview, the informant apologized for the mess in her office, explaining that the 
organization is “very much a non-profit.” Indeed, one of the three agencies in Pittsburgh 
terminated its resettlement operations in 2018 due to a lack of funding and refugee arrivals.  
After conducting interviews with Jane and Kate, I completed online training modules and 
returned to the CSC for ten hours of volunteering and participant observation. I mainly worked in 
an office and the basement, filing paperwork and organizing clothes donations. Consequently, I 
did not have the opportunity to observe many interactions between the CSC staff and refugees. 
However, I have been involved in the US resettlement process over the past four academic years 
as a weekly tutor for refugee families from Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
The tutoring program is organized in a partnership with a university student organization and the 
Pittsburgh resettlement agencies. I am additionally on board of this student organization that 
supports the refugee community in Pittsburgh. Through this role, I regularly interact with local 
migrant-focused organizations and gain experiences that fill out a broader picture of refugee 
resettlement in the city. 
To learn from refugees, I decided to focus on the Bhutanese community in Pittsburgh. With 
over 6,000 resettled Bhutanese refugees in the city, this is one of the largest ethnic refugee 
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communities in the city. I contacted my friend Dago, whom I had met through a university course. 
He had come to the US as a Bhutanese refugee and co-founded the Bhutanese Community Group 
(BCG) in Pittsburgh. After I explained the research project, he agreed to help recruit informants 
for me. I visited the BCG on two Saturdays in March 2017, interviewing four and five refugees on 
each day, respectively, whom Dago had selected for me. He said he recruited both males (6) and 
females (3), as well as both naturalized individuals (8) and a GreenCard holder (1) so as not to bias 
my sample. He included only one GreenCard holding informant because “those who are not 
naturalized have been in the US for a shorter time and may not have good English.” Since the 
majority of informants have been in the US for at least five years, my sample lacks the voices of 
newly arrived individuals or those who have a lower level of English. Interviews were conducted 
in English and lasted about an hour each.   
The BCG is located in a Pittsburgh neighborhood that is home to about 1,000 Bhutanese 
residents. Most of the remaining 5,000 Bhutanese residents live in a neighborhood about four miles 
west. Bhutanese refugees have been resettling in Pittsburgh since 2008; the BCG was established 
in 2012. The BCG building has since moved to a parallel street, still within the same neighborhood. 
This second street houses a number of Bhutanese-owned establishments, including grocers, a 
jeweler, dance studio, and furniture store.  
To gather parallel data in Germany, I interned at the Refugee Welcome Office (RWO) in 
Berlin. Like the CSC, the RWO office is situated in a peripheral neighborhood of the city. It sits 
in a residential area located about a 20-minute bus ride from the neighborhood’s center, in which 
establishments such as the bank, grocery stores, and local government offices are located. With 
over an hour of travel and multiple transfers, residents can reach the historically Turkish and Arab 
 11 
neighborhoods of Berlin via public transportation. The refugees I interviewed did travel to these 
neighborhoods once or twice a week to shop for groceries.  
The RWO building is a former grocery store situated next to the office of the landlord, a 
stationary shop, and a bar. The row of establishments is centrally located among apartment 
complexes in which about 30 refugee families live. Residents thus pass by the RWO when 
returning home. The refugees’ apartments are interspersed within the buildings alongside those of 
German residents.  
In contrast to the individual doored offices layout of the CSC, the RWO was reminiscent 
of a community center. The one-story building has a large window covering two-thirds of the front 
wall. It is decorated with pictures from an Eid al-Fitr celebration that was held in the RWO, as 
well as signs declaring “Welcome!” in multiple languages. Passersby can look through the window 
into the classroom area, which is sectioned off from the waiting area by red patterned curtains. A 
large, L-shaped couch is situated in the waiting room next to a shelf of children’s books. A small 
table offers daily fresh Turkish tea from a 2-tiered teapot—the bottom being for boiling water and 
the top for concentrated tea. A locked closet with donated clothes and other items is behind the 
couch. The rear of the building is comprised of a hallway parallel to the back of the classroom. It 
leads to a small kitchenette on the right, two bathrooms to the left, and a single office straight 
ahead. The office contains two desks and two computers, and is shared by the hired staff (two in 
2017 and three in 2018). The only doors in the building are those for the donations closet, the 
bathrooms, and the office. The bathroom closest to the office is marked with the sign “staff 
restroom”. When I came out of the non-staff restroom one day, a staff member told me to use the 
staff restroom next time because it is nicer.  
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I interviewed four individuals who worked at the RWO over the course of two years 
(Susanne, Paula, Antje and Stephanie). These informants did not all work at the RWO 
concurrently. The positions represented by these individuals are supervisor, staff member and 
volunteer. Interviews were conducted in German and lasted about an hour each. I interviewed four 
Syrian refugees, two of whom live in the neighborhood for which the RWO was responsible and 
two of whom were tour guides at the time of the interviews. I met the former two (Burhan and 
Rasha) through my internship at the RWO; their interviews were conducted in German at the 
RWO. I met the latter two (Sayid and Tarek) by attending their respective tour and requesting an 
interview at the end. I met with each individually at a coffee shop and conducted the interview in 
English by their request. Since I interviewed refugees who were engaged in RWO activities or as 
tour guides, my sample is biased towards individuals who are active in the community. However, 
frequent home visits conducted as part of my internship responsibilities introduced me to 
individuals of diverse ages, language ability, and employment status. For example, I spent hours 
in the homes of refugees learning Arabic from adults and seniors with whom I could not 
communicate enough to conduct a formal interview. Yet personal engagement and participant 
observation in this manner gave me a glimpse into their experience of settlement as well. Their 
stories are not outlined in this thesis, but they corroborate the accounts that informants shared in 
their interviews of fellow community members. 
Due to my role as an intern, I gathered 240 hours of participant observation at the RWO 
over two summer internships. This method of data collection is secondary in this thesis to the 
interviews. Participant observation helps fill out a more comprehensive understanding of refugee 
settlement in Germany as a whole. Although I have more recorded participant observation time in 
Berlin, I have been involved in the US resettlement process over the past four academic years in 
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the capacities described above. To match the hours of refugee engagement in Pittsburgh over four 
years, I spent two summers of concentrated participant observation in Berlin.  
Although I have primarily used data from interviews as opposed to participant observation 
to equalize the data volume from each site, the lack of ethnographic engagement with interviewed 
Bhutanese interviews likely impacted the amount and type of information I could obtain. I was 
introduced to all informants at the time of their interview, so I had built up no individual rapport 
with them. Gaining entrée to the community via an interlocutor, Dago, was thus valuable. One 
Bhutanese informant told me that he had only agreed to this interview because I came with Dago. 
Since all interviews took place on only two days, I spent hours in one conference as one after 
another informant arrived for their appointment.  
The Berlin interviews, in contrast, took place on different days and in different locations—
the RWO, a park, a café. Two of the Syrian informants in Berlin had interacted with me each 
business day for weeks before conducting their interview. The dialogue thus flowed as a natural 
conversation, and they shared details of their journey to and experience in Germany on their own 
accord. I interacted with the other two Syrian informants on multiple occasions as well before 
conducting the interview, and the conversations were thus also more natural and personal.  
The results and analysis from these data are documented in the following chapters. In 
Chapter 2.0, I describe the global refugee regime’s origin and its intersection with other global 
processes to create a complex of factors influencing national policy decisions. Chapter 3.0 focuses 
on the US refugee regime and is subdivided into a history of Bhutanese refugees (3.1), followed 
by analyses of national policies (3.2), local implementation (3.3), and refugee responses (3.4) with 
regard to the three aforementioned figures: laborer, citizen, and neighbor. I conclude that the US 
model emphasizes the figure of a self-sufficient laborer in order to produce a non-demanding 
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citizen and unassuming neighbor. Chapter 4.0 mirrors chapter 3.0 within the context of Syrian 
refugees in Germany. In this case, I argue that federal policy emphasizes creating a dependent 
citizen complemented by the skilled laborer and multicultural neighbor figures. I conclude in 
Chapter 5.0 by addressing the figure primarily emphasized in both the US and Germany case 
studies, allowing for a reflection on precarity. I argue that the primary economic or political 
condition that is most uncertain a refugee’s life is reflected in the principle figure encouraged by 
the federal framework, thereby incentivizing refugees to inhabit a precarious subjectivity. 
Together, these results contribute to existing dialogue by underscoring the complex motivations 
of a refugee-receiving nation. National agendas affirm a resettlement or integration that is 
conditional on a refugee’s fulfillment of subjectification. Indeed, Ramsay affirms that 
“resettlement puts refugees into new contexts of ambiguity in which it is not their politico-legal 
status that is problematised, but the futures that they, as subjects who are marked by assumptions 
of difference and inferiority, represent to the agenda and interests of the host state in which they 
have been settled” (Ramsay 2018:188). I argue that the US resettlement system qualifies care and 
protection on economic productivity. The German settlement conditionalizes refuge on linguistic 
and cultural proficiency. Yet both nations create precarious conditions that prevent the 
actualization of these expectations, thereby perpetuating uncertainty and failing to provide a 
durable solution.  
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2.0 The Global Refugee Regime Complex 
I begin with the historical context of the refugee regime to understand its present-day functioning. 
Outlining the evolution of the dominant institutions today lends insight into the agendas that 
determine federal policies. Furthermore, prefacing the refugee narratives of chapters 3 and 4 within 
this structure mirrors the reality that refugee lives are inserted into predetermined frameworks.  
Asylum seekers cross national borders in pursuit of refugee status recognized by another 
country or the United Nations. As such, migration involving border crossing is innately an 
international issue. An increasingly globalized world, facilitated by transportation and 
communication technology, has strengthened ties among governments, entities, and individuals 
worldwide. In short, this development can be defined as the expansion and intensification of 
worldwide interactions (Steger 2009). Jurgensmeyer, professor of global studies at UC Santa 
Barbara, further describes the study of this phenomenon as “transnational … interdisciplinary … 
contemporary and historical … postcolonial and critical … and promoting global citizenship,” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2011:1-2) These terms mean that the effects of globalization are geographically 
and thematically comprehensive; this process impacts every nation to some degree and 
encompasses disciplines such as economics, politics, culture, and the environment. Yet this is the 
contradiction of globalization: while goods, capital, and information have been circulating more 
freely, human mobility is more repressed than ever (Fassin 2011). As historian Donna Gabaccia 
(1997:186) concludes, “To defend free labor, labor activists had curtailed free migration. 
Immigration restrictions in turn helped to replicate under capitalism some of the inequalities of 
colonialism.” Forced migration scholar Bridget Anderson (2009) notes that restrictions to 
movement have not resulted in fewer border crossings. This illustrates the gravity of repression 
and persecution individuals endure and ultimately flee. Despite the magnified comprehensive cost 
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in terms of livelihood, money, safety, and rights, people still embark on the journey. As Somali-
British poet Warsan Shire describes in her poem “Home” (Shire 2015): 
you only leave home 
when home won't let you stay... 
no one puts their children in a boat 
unless the water is safer than the land. 
The 2017 UN Population Division’s International Migration report counts 258 million 
international migrants, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000 (United Nations 
2017). Of these, 68.5 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced, the greatest number since 
World War II (UNHCR 2018b). Considering the history of mobility lends insight into the factors 
contributing to this shift towards restriction of legitimatized human movement. Analyzing the 
global trends of nationalism, controlled travel, securitization, humanitarianism, and neoliberalism 
sets the stage for understanding the rationale of the American and German refugee resettlement 
and integration frameworks.  
2.1 The Emergent Global Refugee Regime 
Development of the nation-state system is inextricably linked to displacement. Borders define 
boundaries of belonging and non-belonging. Migration documentation has the power to legitimize 
border crossings by classifying humans as legal or illegal. The era of globalization and 
transnationalism has furthermore created fear surrounding the loss of geographic sovereignty and 
the culture contained within it. Many states have responded to this fear by shifting towards a 
defensive nationalism associated with border control (Kearney 1991), imposing a surveillance 
apparatus that polices borders, detains aliens, and deports illegals (Fassin 2011). The passport, 
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created in 1920 in the aftermath of WWI, is used by many states to monopolize legitimate 
movement (Torpey 2000). 
Indeed, the concept of a “refugee” emerged only with the creation of the modern nation-
state (Barnett 2002). While a nascent refugee regime developed with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
which outlined the right of religious minorities or dissidents to emigrate with their property 
(Golden 2012), neither a formal definition for ‘refugee’ nor a global system of policies existed 
(Barnett 2002). In other words, though displacement has long existed, an international sense of 
responsibility has not.  
It was not until the fierce nationalism fueling two 20th century world wars and leading to 
mass global displacement that countries recognized refugees as an international matter. This notion 
was manifested in the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR). Created in 
1921, it was the first organization transcending national borders to address forced displacement 
(Barnett 2002). Oxford scholar Alexander Betts (2010) describes this emerging refugee regime as 
“virtually the only form of institutionalized cooperation in the area of human mobility” (13).   
Following World War II the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
replaced its League of Nations predecessor. The UNHCR’s role is to oversee the implementation 
of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, which outlines the definition and rights of a 
refugee. The UNHCR and its Convention legitimize forcibly displaced individuals with 
“transnational nobility” (Fassin 2005:374). These institutions furthermore codify an agreement to 
asylum rights that transcends domestic politics and nation-state sovereignty. This international 
cooperation is manifest in two forms: asylum-granting and “burden-sharing” (Betts 2010). In the 
former, states comply with an international law that individuals have a right to seek asylum and 
have their case reviewed while receiving minimum standards of housing and subsistence. “Burden-
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sharing” is expressed in financial support or the resettlement of refugees from a host nation to a 
third country. The label “burden” merits critical analysis, as such language implies that refugees 
themselves are the burden while neglecting structural factors such as conflict, environmental 
disasters or climate change, and economic instability that instigate migration. While the UNHCR 
has no formal enforcement power (Barnett 2002), states often comply for the purposes of 
legitimacy and reciprocity, though this compliance is increasingly under threat (Betts 2010).  
It is crucial to highlight again at this point the distinct US and German contexts. In relation 
to the Bhutanese, the US is a third country of resettlement. As such, the state conducts its own 
vetting process of individuals already granted asylum in a host country. The US thus individually 
selects Bhutanese refugees to resettle. In relation to Syrians, Germany is primarily a host country 
that grants protection to individuals who have crossed its border and applied for asylum. These 
individuals complete several application renewals to secure permanent settlement in Germany. I 
will thus use “resettlement” to refer to the US refugee regime and “settlement” to refer to the 
German regime, or “re/settlement” when discussing both. Despite these distinct methods of 
refugee reception and re/settlement, discussing both side-by-side is valid due to their shared 
conditional refuge. I argue that both the US and German refugee regimes shape refugee 
subjectivity by enforcing subjectification and prompting refugees’ agency to respond. Indeed, in 
her analysis of the Australian refugee regime, Ramsay (2018:202) affirms that “refugees are not 
only expected to be subservient but to dissolve the apparent burden of their resettlement to 
Australia by becoming a particular kind of citizen whose value is measured through economic 
productivity and whose differences must be subsumed into the dominant culture, rather than 
embraced.” This conditionality perpetuates displacement as an “existential condition” that creates 
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a precarious livelihood in both the present and future (Ramsay 2018:203). As such, refuge is not 
simply a politico-legal condition (Ramsay 2018).  
2.2 The Global Refugee Regime Complex  
With increased globalization, Betts (2010) argues, this global refugee regime headed by the 
UNHCR has become a refugee complex of multiple regimes, including controlled travel, 
securitization, humanitarianism, and labor. To begin, the refugee regime interacts with travel and 
security regimes to enforce state sovereignty and limit a state’s obligation to the Convention 
without violating it (Betts 2010). Even as border crossings increase, the comprehensive cost 
magnifies as well, in terms of money, safety, and rights. Borders are more militarized, expensive 
human smugglers have become the only feasible means to migration for many, and rights-bearing 
statuses are more difficult to obtain (Anderson, et al. 2009). Within the EU, a nation’s obligation 
to provide an asylum seeker with basic necessities while reviewing their application is activated 
only once an individual has crossed their border (Hansen 2014). Thus, a state can limit its 
obligation by curbing an asylum seeker’s access to its territory. These efforts are evident in visa 
requirements, declarations of safe country of origin, interdiction at sea, and the designation of 
airports as safe zones (Hansen 2014).  
Access to asylum thus becomes managed by the travel regime’s control of mobility. Such 
regulations constitute “regime shifting” (Betts 2010:14), transferring responsibility for a problem 
from one regime to another. States employ this shifting in order to minimize their commitment to 
reviewing applications, complying with minimum treatment standards, and granting asylum 
without violating the Convention (Betts 2010). Furthermore, language of a refugee crisis evokes 
fear and is used to justify harsh border protection laws that limit entry at the expense of asylum-
seeker rights (Zolberg and Benda 2001). Similar to the “burden-sharing” terminology, the 
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implications of such loaded language merit a critical analysis outside the scope of this thesis (see 
Holmes and Castaneda 2016).  
Minimizing a state’s obligation to asylum seekers through enforcement of the travel and 
security regimes concurrently magnifies the role of globalized humanitarianism. This redirects the 
refugee system from the political to the non-governmental sphere in a “humanitarianization of 
asylum” (Fassin 2005:372). Miriam Ticktin (2016) identifies three problems with this shift. First, 
humanitarianism is rooted in notions of innocence. A worthy beneficiary must be a victim detached 
from the politics and responsibility of their plight. Yet it is unrealistic to imagine an apolitical 
individual lacking will, agency, or acumen, as it is often these very traits that facilitated their flight. 
Ticktin (2016:259) describes this as requiring “innocent sufferers to be represented in the passivity 
of their suffering, not in the action they take to confront and escape it.” 
Furthermore, innocence quickly entangles with its counterpart, guilt. For example, the 2015 
ISIS attacks on Paris shifted refugees’ characterization as innocent victims to guilty terrorists in a 
moment. This binary of innocence and guilt leaves no room for refugees who are neither victims 
nor criminals. Ticktin (2016) maintains that this schema “leave[s] no space for experiences of 
life… There is no way to recognize them, no law or language by which to give them space to live 
or die regular or mundane lives” (257-259). 
Second, humanitarianism responds to emergency situations deemed unpredictable and 
transitory. This framework neglects the historical context and root causes of a crisis (Ticktin 2016). 
The global refugee condition, as described above, has a sustained history. The fact that the 
European border management agency Frontex has developed technologies such as sensors, 
cameras and drones, or that the EU and UNHCR have offshored asylum procedures to border 
countries such as Morocco since the 1990s to block migrant entry, betray the unpredictability and 
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temporality of an emergency (Ticktin 2016). Yet emergency rhetoric allows states to address the 
present rather than confront histories such as the drug war and arms trade or forsake the lucrative 
surveillance, detention and prison industries. This, again, limits a nation’s obligation to asylum 
seekers (Ticktin 2016).  
Finally, humanitarianism relies on compassion. In this context, asylum is granted through 
moral imperative, not political ideals. Fassin (2011) describes this as a discretionary 
humanitarianism that replaces the right to asylum. As such, the specificity of refugee status wanes 
and the asylum system loses validity (Fassin 2011). Ticktin (2014) refers to this as the “politics” 
or “regimes” of care that play a role in governing immigration. The humanitarian regime may thus 
actually delegitimize the human rights regime. In 1990s France, for example, a law was passed 
granting residency to critically ill undocumented immigrants. This consequently compelled some 
sans papiers (“those without papers”) to self-inflict injury or infection (Ticktin, 2011). Within this 
humanitarian regime, rights rooted in legal principles have been reduced to paternalism. A state’s 
display of humanitarian aid demonstrates generous compassion rather than recognition of a right 
to asylum, once again narrowing a nation’s responsibility to asylum-seekers.  
Finally, I consider labor as a fourth regime interacting with the controlled travel, 
securitization and humanitarianism regimes to shape a refugee regime complex. The labor regime 
is tied to the growing global dominance of the neoliberal project. In short, neoliberalism is rooted 
in self-governing actors who engage society through market-based relationships. This is manifest 
in the breakdown of public safety nets, deregulation of markets, privatization, and 
“commercialisation of nonprofit activities” (Evans, et al. 2005:92). Ticktin (2014:1018) declares 
that “neoliberal economic policies have increasingly become the global norm.” To compete on the 
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global scale, the nation-state develops its bureaucratic, intellectual and common practices to shape 
a cultural revolution towards a capitalist society (Kearney 1991).  
In addition to these internal transformations, Kearney (1991) describes two global 
processes that contributed to the development of the nation-state: “tension with other emergent 
absolute states…[and] the tension between the nation-state and its dependencies” (53). In other 
words, borders promote national unity, thus differentiating people on a global scale as citizens of 
particular nation-states to compete with other nations. Nation-state borders thus became important 
markers for belonging and non-belonging.  Yet at the same time, socioeconomic differentiation is 
magnified within a country to garner cheap labor, such as through the blue-collar or undocumented 
working class.  
These tensions are evident within the refugee regime. Regarding global tensions, nation-
states compete with another and with transnational corporations on a stage dominated by neoliberal 
capitalism. This fierce race has contributed to forced displacement. The late Director of the 
Institute of Race Relations, Ambalavaner Sivanandan, argues that global capital has power. 
Through transnational aid and development agencies, for example, poorer nations are compelled 
to accept austerity measures that erode indigenous welfare provisions and tie them to foreign 
powers and capital. Sivanandan declares: “Resistance to economic immiseration is inseparable 
from resistance to political persecution. The economic migrant is also the political refugee…While 
giant corporations, richer than whole continents and more powerful than nation states, try to cohere 
the world economically, more and more people are being displaced from their countries and their 
homes” (Sivanandan 2001:88). This argument underscores the need to complicate the category of 
“refugee”. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
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reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” 
(UN General Assembly 1951). Yet this definition has considerable limitations. It neglects, for 
example, poverty or climate change as causes of flight. The UN estimates 50 million 
environmentally displaced persons in 2020, and up to 200 million by the middle of the century 
(Wennersten, et al. 2017).  
In addition to impacting the movement of asylum seekers, neoliberal ideology is also 
embedded within their reception, illustrating the tension between nation-states and dependencies. 
Economic pragmatism can trump asylum pleas. Globalization increasingly calculates the worth of 
humanity in terms of marketplace value and economic contribution. Regarding migration, this 
competitiveness prioritizes highly skilled, wealthy, self-sufficient individuals who can 
immediately contribute to the economy (Arat-Koc 1999). Thus, the neoliberal regime integrates 
with the travel regime in order to favor a particular migrant (or refugee) subject.  
The Canadian Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS) highlights a trend 
in academic literature surrounding “neoliberalism’s concentration on the more immediate 
economic benefits of immigration and the economic focus of immigration policy making” (Root, 
et al. 2014:4) Dobrowolsky (2013:197) outlines the Canadian policy measures that neoliberal 
calculations favor, which are applicable to other neoliberal-driven states such as the US and 
Germany: 
a. attract highly skilled immigrants 
b. expand low wage, temporary foreign worker programs 
c. diversify immigration “entry doors” and make some more flexible 
d. cut admission and settlement costs 
e. encourage settlement in less well-populated areas 
f. tighten border controls and crack down on undocumented migrants 
g. change citizenship rules to reduce risks of undesired costs and unrealized benefits to the 
state 
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h. sell immigration to the Canadian public ... through a policy rhetoric that emphasizes the 
hoped-for benefits of immigration while downplaying risks and disappointing outcomes 
(Dobrowolsky 2013:197). 
 
Using this framework of a multifaceted global refugee complex, I use chapters 3.1 and 4.1 
to consider how transnational regimes are unevenly integrated to shape the national re/settlement 
frameworks of the US and Germany. Rather than focusing merely on policies that are either 
conformed to or broken, I analyze how the nation-state attempts to shape refugee desires so the 
expected subjectification is a priority of the refugee as well. Instead of persuading a refugee to 
reproduce certain relations to the government, economy and society, the state uses constitutive 
rhetoric to teach values of identity (Charland 1987). As Dykstra-DeVette (2018:183) describes, 
“Charland’s (1987) constitutive rhetoric interprets resettlement not as an attempt to persuade 
refugees to be ‘good’ workers, community members, and citizens, but as a rhetorical process that 
teaches these values, and thereby constitutes refugees as ideal citizens.” James Boyd White 
(1989:x), founder of the constitutive rhetoric theory, describes this discourse as “the art of 
constituting character, community and culture in language.” Through this lens, I focus on three 
particular figures: the type of laborer, type of citizen, and type of neighbor a host nation envisions 
for a refugee. These correspond to the expected relations a refugee should have towards the 
economic, political, and social spheres. 
In sections 3.2 and 4.2, I explore the discourse and practices of staff at refugee-serving 
organizations. By implementing federal policies, these organizations help bring refugee 
subjectification into lived reality. In sections 3.3 and 4.3, I recount refugees’ individual agency in 
the reproduction, appropriation, and rejection of three particular figures comprising this 
institutional subjectification. This intersection comprises the composite refugee subjectivity.  
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3.0 Bhutanese Refugees in Pittsburgh 
3.1 Historical Context 
The forced migration history of Bhutanese refugees reveals the junction of the refugee, labor, and 
travel regimes. Bhutan, a small nation between India and China, began commissioning craftsmen 
in 1620 from neighboring Nepal to build a stupa (place of meditation) and provide laborers for 
infrastructure projects. The migrants remained and settled in southern Bhutan, gaining the name 
Lhotshampa, which means people from the south (Shrestha, et al. 1998). Yet they lived in relative 
insecurity and only gained full citizenship under the 1958 Citizenship Act. Bhutan initiated 
planned development in the 1960s and joined the United Nations in 1971, increasing its 
development assistance and interaction with the global world. Also during this time, many 
Lhotshampas began occupying influential positions in the bureaucracy as a result of the 
government’s efforts to incorporate them into mainstream society.  
As these Bhutanese of Nepali origins grew in number and influence, they came to be seen 
as political, economic, and cultural threats. Consequently, Lhotshampas were systematically 
removed through a targeted census categorizing who is a “national” and through a “one nation, 
one people” policy mandating Bhutanese dress and language. The state justified its actions as a 
safeguard against a “demographic inundation.” Bhutan’s era of economic growth occurred 
concurrently with the exile of 1/6 of its population. Most Lhotshampas fled to Nepal, where the 
UNHCR established refugee camps. In 2006 the US offered to resettle 60,000 Bhutanese refugees, 
who had by then been in camps for over 20 years (Neikirk and Nickson 2017).  
The refugee camp was simultaneously a place of security and difficulty. Abhaya lived in 
one with her family for 18 years. Her marriage and her son’s birth took place in the camp.  Though 
she and her parents had initially tried living on their own in Nepal, they could not sustain a 
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livelihood and decided to enter the camp. Still, “the camp was really difficult,” she says. Dima, a 
fellow refugee who also married her husband in a Nepali camp, describes the conditions: 
They provided us with oil and rice every fifteen days. Vegetables every seven days. And 
they provide oil, rice, lentils and sugar for fifteen days.  And they gave us a little land to 
build a hut…And they provided kerosene gas for a month I think…In the hut there is no 
electricity. 
 
This dependence on humanitarian aid and the difficult camp conditions were compounded 
by discrimination and exclusion from society. The refugees’ expulsion from Bhutan and 
marginalization within Nepali society also intersected with national economic interests, creating a 
stark contradiction of rejected bodies yet welcomed labor. Neten’s story exemplifies this 
discrepancy. He and his wife Abhaya were originally resettled to the Bronx. He currently works 
full-time for the Bhutanese Community Group (BCG) in Pittsburgh, managing citizenship classes 
in seven locations and leading community outreach. While in a Nepali refugee camp, he helped 
start a school in the camp. After volunteer teaching there for two years, he received a scholarship 
for two years of higher education in Kathmandu, located a 13-hour bus ride from the refugee camp. 
Upon completion, he was hired as a teacher in private boarding schools in Kathmandu. Yet his 
value as a working teacher was separated from his value as a culture-bearing individual. Neten 
described the discrimination he experienced due to his refugee status, yet a personal resolve to 
affirm his identity:  
I know some tried [to hide their refugee status] because they wanted to avoid being looked 
down upon. But then I always found it very difficult to speak lies. So I dared to tell the 
truth rather than feel humiliated telling lies...Sometimes I felt that, if I had not revealed that 
I was a refugee, some colleagues would not behave in that way. But it was better than 
telling lies.... I didn’t look any different than the Nepalese. Except for a slightly different 
dialect, we spoke the same language. I had the same last name as many people in Nepal 
have. So it wouldn’t cause any problem. But I thought: I am ok with telling the truth of 
who I am.  
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Dima likewise affirmed the discrimination of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and explained 
why she chose to remain discrete: 
We lived as refugees in Nepal, and our country is Bhutan. And Nepal said, “They are 
refugees, they are homeless, they don’t have anything…they come into our land, are sitting 
here, they don’t have any legal right for anything.” …. We had to hide our identity when 
we were in Nepal because refugees don’t have legal documents, so we don’t get a 
government job or get into a nice private school because our identity is a refugee…. I 
worked there but hid my identity. I said I am a local of that country.  
 
Dima’s husband, however, did not conceal his status because his expertise in math and 
science was needed. This again highlights the separation of labor from the body. If a refugee offers 
valuable labor, his otherwise despised status can be overlooked. Dima explains:  
My husband never hid his identity. He would always say “I am a Bhutanese” and tell the 
truth. Because he is a student of math and science, they still hired him. Because it’s hard 
to find a math and science teacher, they provided a job. 
 
Neten further describes the implications of borders on identity and mobility: 
People say…borders are nothing, it is one country, the world is one country. But 
practically, it is not. You feel when you have to cross borders. And when people ask you 
“where are you from?” And when you cannot say you are from Bhutan although you came 
from there, you were born there, you lived there. It is painful. So becoming or belonging 
to a country is an accomplishment…I was stateless for twenty two years. That is adding 
seventeen years of my life in exile, and then five years here before I obtained my 
citizenship. I always used to think that I didn’t belong to any country, because Bhutan 
didn’t want us back, and Nepal was not in a position to give us citizenship.  
 
Being resettled in the US gives hope of obtaining that which Bhutanese lacked in Nepal: 
self-sustained livelihood, affirmed identity, and freedom of movement. Rather than relying on 
humanitarian aid in a UNHCR-run camp, resettled refugees will provide for themselves. Instead 
of hiding their national identity or status, Bhutanese will be welcomed into the American melting 
pot as resettled refugees. No longer bound to a camp that can only be left with permission, resettled 
refugees will gain mobility. Yet as subsequent sections reveal, these hopes are not fully realized. 
Rather, actual conditions mirror the marginalization evidenced in Nepal. First, the expectations set 
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forth in the US national resettlement framework perpetuate the disembodied labor seen in Nepal. 
A self-sustained livelihood is expected yet difficult to achieve. Furthermore, Bhutanese are 
expected to dampen their cultural identity so as to be less conspicuous. These findings are 
described in greater detail in subsequent sections. Finally, mobility proved to be a continued 
challenge. As Neten describes: 
I had the biggest pain when I had to travel…. We get travel documents as refugees and not 
passports. And I had lots of trouble in airports, many airports. Many people working in the 
airport don’t know that refugees travel with travel documents. They kept saying “passport,” 
and I kept saying, “I am a refugee and this is all the documentation we get to travel.” At 
one time, I almost lost my flight because they didn’t know what a travel document is…So 
that is one pain when you are not a national of any country—travel difficulties. 
 
The following section traces the history of US asylum policies to its current formulation to 
provide context for an elaborated explanation of the conditions described above, particularly in 
light of local organizations’ practices and refugee responses.  
3.2 US Refugee Regime 
As described in the previous chapter, codification of asylum policies emerged only in the 20th 
century as a result of the World Wars. Prior to 1945, individuals seeking resettlement to the US 
had to be sponsored by an individual who would ensure they did not become a public burden 
(Brown and Scribner 2014). President Truman’s executive order in 1945 prioritized the 
resettlement of displaced persons and acknowledged voluntary organizations (called ‘Volags’) as 
sponsoring agencies. Refugee resettlement thus came almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of 
“nonprofit voluntary agencies [that] assumed primary responsibility for assisting refugees” (Moore 
1980). The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 further distinguished refugees from immigrants to 
circumvent the stringent quota system. Yet the resettlement framework operated on an ad hoc 
basis, responding to specific refugee populations as they emerged. With the influx of Hungarian 
refugees in 1956, for example, the federal government began paying Volags approximately $40 
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per refugee, with the caveat that this funding did not constitute a precedent for future migrations. 
The Cuban Refugee Program (1959) and Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (1975) further 
illustrate the case-by-case framework. These provisional programs led to inconsistencies, for 
example with Volags receiving $1,100 for resettling Soviet refugees and only $500 for resettling 
Indochinese refugees. In 1979, former Senator Dick Clark as newly appointed United States 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs called for a standardization of federal refugee policy.  
The Refugee Act of 1980 was passed the following year to outline the objectives of the US 
resettlement program. A central objective was promoting refugee self-sufficiency, defined as 
financial independence. Elimination of the original 60-day work exemption in 1982 made 
economic self-sufficiency the singular primary objective, while other goals outlined in the Act 
such as employment training and language acquisition were disregarded. 
The refugee resettlement program today continues under this framework. Federal support 
for Volags and the refugees they sponsor flows from two agencies: the State Department’s Bureau 
of Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the Department of Health & Human Services’ 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (Brown and Scribner 2014). The PRM’s objective is 
resettling the most vulnerable populations. It provides Volags with $2,075 per refugee (FY 2016), 
$1,125 of which must be spent on direct support of refugees. This leaves $950 for the operation of 
the Volag (Bruno and Library of Congress. Congressional Research 2017). Although the PRM 
states that this funding is meant to ensure basic needs and case management prior to and for the 
first 90 days after a refugee’s arrival, a 2009 financial analysis concluded that the federal 
contribution covers only 39% of the total costs accumulated in this period (Kriehbiel 2009).  
The ORR operates with the goal of promoting self-sufficiency through providing 
employment-related services as well as Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refuge Medical 
 30 
Assistance (RMA). The RCA and RMA were originally available for 36 months, but that was 
quickly reduced to 18 months in 1982 and to eight months (its current standing) in 1991 with the 
argument that such welfare inhibited self-sufficiency (Brown and Scribner 2014). A Government 
Accountability Office report from 1990 concluded that ORR funding per refugee declined 45% 
between 1985 and 1989 (United States General Accounting 1990). This aligned with a general 
shift in US policy away from federal support systems. Benson argues that “market-based rationale 
and strategies became the basis for most social policy in the neoliberalizing policy environment of 
the early 1980s” (Benson 2016). The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, for example, 
introduced the largest peacetime cuts to federal domestic discretionary spending up until that point 
(Ellwood 1982). This restricted funding continued through the decades; the US Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations stated in a report entitled Abandoned Upon Arrival that “resettlement efforts 
in many US cities are underfunded, overstretched, and failing to meet the basic needs of the refugee 
populations” (Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2010).  
The US refugee regime’s current framework reveals that its inception was 
contemporaneous with an era of privatization and marketization. Today, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the era of globalization and transnationalism has created fear surrounding the 
loss of geographic sovereignty and the culture contained within it. The shift towards nationalism 
and securitization is reshaping refugee figures from a “dependent or docile worker” (Benson 
2016:542) to that of a threatening, radical other. This fear is exploited in political far-right 
arguments that immigrants are to blame for unemployment, social fragmentation, and failed 
migration and integration policies themselves (Flint and Robinson 2008). This trend has become 
increasingly evident in the United States. According to the PRM, in 2015, “the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program reflects the core values of the United States and our strong tradition of 
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providing a safe haven for the oppressed.” In 2017, Secretary of State Pompeo updated this 
sentiment: “This year’s refugee ceiling also reflects our commitment, our commitment to protect 
the most vulnerable around the world while prioritizing the safety and well-being of the American 
people…We will continue to assist the world’s most vulnerable while never losing sight of our 
first duty, serving the American people.” As this thesis will illustrate, the US refugee regime today 
is at the juncture of reconciling the ideals of a self-sufficient laborer with that of a compliant citizen 
and assimilating, nonthreatening neighbor. 
3.2.1  Laborer 
The national shift towards marketization and privatization, concurrent with the emergence of the 
Refugee Act of 1980, established the refugee subjectification of a hardworking and rapidly self-
sufficient laborer that dominates today. All refugees are authorized to work upon arrival in the US 
and acquisition of a social security number. Such permission is vital because refugees do, indeed, 
need to begin working within a few weeks of arrival to sustain themselves. The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement within the Department of State provides a one-time sum of $1,125 per refugee to pay 
for direct refugee services and essentials such as housing, clothing, and food. This amount is meant 
to pay for approximately the first three months in the US. However, the Refugee Act outlines that 
federal cash assistance is conditioned upon quick employment: “Cash assistance provided...to an 
employable refugee is conditioned, except for good cause shown, on the refugees’ registration with 
an appropriate agency providing employment services…and on the refugee’s acceptance of 
appropriate offers of employment” effective two months after a refugee’s arrival (Benson 
2016:539). 
Emerging alongside the role of a self-sufficient laborer today is that of a compliant citizen 
and assimilating neighbor. Though often framed with the rhetoric of combatting the threatening, 
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culturally other, assimilation is also an economic calculation. As Kearney (1991:53) argues, 
“Modern capitalism necessarily entailed formation of nation-state as a cultural revolution.” 
Consolidating internal cultural differentiation strengthens laborer motivation by promoting 
national unity and hope for a better life. Incentivized workers, in turn, foster national fitness for 
global competition. Kearney (1991) describes the US as an embodiment of this ideal, with its 
“power to dissolve the ethnicity of its huddled immigrant masses and to reconstruct it as 
‘American’” (55). 
Foundational to the American narrative is “social mobility and economic independence” 
(Dykstra-DeVette 2018), the crux of the American Dream. Yet the rhetoric of unity and prosperity 
remains a façade to exhibit to the rest of the world because, at the same time, the state must ensure 
“the reproduction of difference as social inequality” (Kearney 1991:180). A capitalist state requires 
compliant, subordinated low-wage workers, and refugees often fulfill these roles. As such, an 
effort to consolidate cultural differentiation is evident in refugees’ expected repatriation as an 
American in speech, culture, and thought. Yet the perpetuation of social inequality is evidenced in 
their inferior position within the market. In other words, a nation-state must simultaneously 
elaborate and resolve the contradiction of differentiation in the market and unity in the community 
(Kearney 1991). One binary will invariably outweigh the other. Robert Ware warns of market 
differentiation dominating and thereby permeating community:  
Communities are the place for public moral activity, while markets are the place for private 
economic activity. Communities, at their best, foster recognition, care and co-operation. 
Markets foster anonymity, independence and competition. Communities are considered the 
place for openness, security and trust. Markets are the place for secrecy, insecurity and 
distrust…. Communities look for dignity and equality. Markets look for fitness and 
success…The problem is that our society is awash with market but in need of substantive 
community with public values (Ware 1999:307).  
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Comparing the ethnographic data of this study against Ware’s description, it becomes 
evident that the market is winning this tug-of-war. Evans et al. (2005) describe this shift as one 
“from a ‘public service orientation to a ‘new market-based managerialism’” (93) among non-
profits. When the market paradigm is deemed the only model capable of producing “effectiveness, 
efficiency, and economy,” the business model is applied to non-profit service organizations 
(Evans, et al. 2005:79). 
3.2.2  Citizen 
In this thesis, the term ‘citizen’ refers to a refugee’s expected relation to the government. It entails 
legal status (refugee, permanent resident, or citizen), as well as the training of prospective citizens. 
Ong and Ebrary (2003) describe this as cultural reconstruction, or the “sociocultural process of 
subjectification” (28) through which refugees are crafted into “New Americans.”  
Bhutanese refugees who are resettled to the United State via applying for asylum with the 
UNHCR while in a refugee camp begin their relation to the US government long before arrival. 
While in a Nepali refugee camp, individuals must complete registration and an interview with the 
UNHCR to be granted refugee status. If their application is approved, the UNHCR may refer them 
to nations such as the US or Canada for third country resettlement. If the US accepts the referral, 
a rigorous vetting process, including multiple background checks, screenings, and interviews, is 
conducted by the Departments of State and Homeland Security. The entire procedure can take 18-
24 months. Sangay is a Bhutanese refugee working at the BCG. Having lived in a Nepali refugee 
camp for 17 years before arriving in Pittsburgh in 2008, he described the challenge of the asylum 
and vetting process, contrasting it to the narrative that refugees can easily slip into the country: 
We are given two or three days of orientation in the refugee camp before everything is 
processed. After all the documents are cleared, the orientation is the last step. So it takes a 
long time. So there is a lot of noise right now during the election that refugees can come 
here easily. It is not easy. It took us one year, some people it takes two years. That waiting 
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process is very long. Case-working, making an individual history of each and every family 
member, background check, back and forth with the Nepali government where we live. So 
they do background checks with the local Nepali criminal system. Then they do the US 
system. It takes such a long time. Then health screening, if you have any infectious diseases 
that you carry over to America. So many things that you undergo. So the waiting process 
is one of the toughest I know. I don’t know, there is a lot of political rhetoric around it that 
anyone can slip in here easily. It is not so easy. 
 
This elaborate process highlights again the distinction between asylum with settlement 
(integration) and resettlement. Third countries such as the US select which refugees will be 
accepted for resettlement. Yet despite this rigorous vetting, rhetoric surrounding the perceived 
danger of refugees who slip into the country unnoticed and pose a terrorist threat remains. This 
uninformed narrative caricatures refugees as cunning intruders and pre-positions them in 
opposition to the state.  
Those refugees who are selected for resettlement are flown to the US with a pre-purchased 
plane ticket that they must eventually pay off. Refugees are received in the airport by staff from 
their Volag-assigned resettlement agency, such as the CSC. They are taken to a Department of 
Human Services office to apply for benefits, and to the Social Security Office to obtain a Social 
Security number. Refugees receive eight months of refugee healthcare, after which they can apply 
for Medicaid. After one year, they must apply for a Green Card to change their status to Legal 
Permanent Resident. After five years, refugees are eligible to apply for citizenship through a 
process that involves passing a civics exam and being interviewed.  
3.2.3  Neighbor 
Little to no federal oversight is involved in prescribing a refugee’s relation to society. A brief 
orientation workshop may be conducted overseas while individuals are still in a refugee camp, but 
no federal mandate addresses language attainment or community integration. Refugees have 
freedom of movement; they do not need to remain in the community in which they were initially 
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resettled. The expectation of an assimilating, inconspicuous neighbor is more enforced at the local 
level, as described in the following section.  
3.3 Localized Refugee Regime 
Pittsburgh, a city known for being the original Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood, is home to around 5,000 
Bhutanese residents. The children’s show, created by Fred Rogers in 1962, provided thoughtful 
discussion on topics such as feelings, family, and differences. The program’s theme song ends 
with the oft-repeated phrase: “Won’t you please, won’t you please—please, won’t you be my 
neighbor?” While Pittsburgh prides itself in neighborliness, my ethnographic research at the CSC, 
a local resettlement agency for refugees, reveals the factors that complicate this idealistic vision 
and confine it to a world as fictional as Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood of Make-Believe. Driven by 
the ideals promoted by federal policy, the resettlement agency enforces subjectification that 
characterizes what type of neighbor, citizen and laborer refugees are expected to become. 
 To understand a local organization’s relation to the refugee, it is important to first 
understand the federal government’s efforts to shape the organization itself. This provides vital 
insight into how organizations may perpetuate this subjectification when interacting with refugees.  
In the United States, privatization outsources refugee resettlement to a public-private 
partnership (Benson 2016). The International Organization for Migration assigns vetted refugees 
to one of nine national Volags, which allocate them to regional resettlement agencies. These 
agencies have signed a cooperative agreement with the State Department to provide essential 
services to refugees for the first 30-90 days after arrival. The CSC is one of three resettlement 
agencies in Pittsburgh.  
Through the privatization of refugee resettlement, welfare provisions become “infused 
with a pro-business agenda and managerialism…. A new policy strategy adopting a business 
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model that redefines the policy goals and outcomes of the human services domain in 
predominantly economic terms” (Benson 2016:523). The work of the resettlement agency is thus 
itself framed within a competitive marketplace context. For example, staff must pitch their client 
to prospective landlords even before the refugee arrives in America. They must assure a landlord 
that the refugee will become quickly self-sufficient and support their argument with employment 
statistics and program descriptions. Jane is a CSC staff member who has experience in housing 
assistance. She describes the challenge of persuading landlords to accept refugees and the tactics 
she employs: 
Landlords also are concerned about their ability to pay rent. Renting to a refugee from a 
financial standpoint can be risky. They have a guaranteed two or three months of rental 
assistance from the agency, but beyond that we can't guarantee. We talk to landlords about 
our employment programs and our success rates in finding jobs for clients; I tell them about 
our connections to employers and play up the fact that, even though they can't get help 
from us, we have great employment programs and professionals who are dedicated to 
finding work. 
 
 Jane also describes competition among resettlement agencies themselves as they fight for 
the same jobs and housing for their clients. Evans et al. (2005) affirm that the neoliberal market-
based regulation of non-profits requires them to “engage in more competitive practices with 
negative consequences for nonprofit mission, culture and labour-management practices” (73). 
Financial instability also undercuts long-term planning and contributes to a non-profit’s 
precarity (Evans, et al. 2005). In the US, a resettlement agency receives funding for its operational 
services per capita—$950 for each refugee they receive. Since the refugee acceptance ceiling is 
set by the president each year, an agency’s funding changes annually based on the political climate. 
Given the numerous travel bans and anti-refugee sentiment of the current administration, refugee 
reception numbers have significantly dropped. One of the three resettlement agencies in Pittsburgh 
was forced to close its reception services in 2018 as a result. This aligns with the observation made 
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by Evans, Richmond and Shields (2005:92): “For the nonprofit sector, neoliberal restructuring is 
resulting in the commercialisation of nonprofit activities and the loss of autonomy as NPOs [non-
profit organizations] become tied to government-controlled contracts” (Evans, et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, a significant portion of an organization’s resources is allotted to securing the funds 
vital to operation. A Canadian study estimated in 2002 that the cost of completing paperwork 
required by a funder “constitutes as much as 20% of the value of the contract – an amount rarely 
acknowledged in the funding award itself” (Evans, 2005:86).   
Given their dependence on federal funding, resettlement agencies tend not to take explicit 
political stances. As such, non-profits can help legitimize the market-driven paradigm by 
depoliticizing human needs, thereby annulling the need for federal safety nets (Evans, et al. 2005). 
They can operate within the system to treat the symptoms of suffering rather than reshaping the 
framework to address causes. As mentioned, a fundamental aspect of the system is outsourcing 
public welfare to private or public-private partnership organizations. These entities, such as 
resettlement agencies, are thus a vital aspect of filling the gaps left by a privatized, marketized 
regime. Since the gaps are being addressed to a degree, the government can justify taking less 
responsibility. This humanitarianization of resettlement mirrors the humanitarianization of asylum 
that Fassin (2005) describes, whereby the nation-state similarly shifts its obligations to another 
entity. Such shifting leaves resettlement agencies to fend for themselves, as evidenced by CSC 
staff describing their reliance on charities. For example, they resort to temporary housing in a 
religious institution or with a community member when no apartment can be secured for an 
arriving family. They also seek additional money through agency-organized fundraisers, Sadaqah 
(voluntary charity) from a mosque, or an emergency fund at the resettlement agency.   
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This trend is echoed in Ann Porter’s argument (2012) that the free market shrinks the social 
welfare state and places the responsibility of “social reproduction and basic caring needs” (27) on 
the nuclear, self-sufficient family. If the family support system fails, individuals should turn to the 
non-profit sector (Evans, et al. 2005). The organizations within this sector are themselves 
precarious and dependent on competing for grants and funding. Ideas of self-sufficiency are thus 
not only promoted, but essentially demanded due to the continued curtailment of social safety nets 
(Arat-Koc 1999). Poppendieck (1999) argues that this makes it “easier for the government to shed 
its responsibility for the poor…. It is not an accident that poverty grows deeper as our charitable 
responses to it multiply” (5-6). 
The federal government can avoid responsibility by subjecting non-profits to narrow 
bureaucratic accountability (Evans, et al. 2005), creating a significant power dynamic. According 
to the Refugee Act, states must “meet standards, goals, and priorities, developed by the ORR 
director” and submit an annual report “on the uses of funds” to receive federal funding (Benson 
2016:533). It must furthermore “submit to the (ORR) Director a plan which provides a description 
of how the State intends to encourage effective resettlement and to promote economic self-
sufficiency as quickly as possible” (Benson 2016:536). Evans et al. (2005) conclude that “the result 
is centralised decentralisation; the state is able to control outcomes through market-based contracts 
and managerialist accountability structures. This is a conscious consequence of neoliberal 
governance restructuring” (88). As such, the US resettlement model involves significant state 
regulation.  Yet it is manifest in a more subversive manner so the state cannot be held accountable 
when resettlement is unsuccessful. In placing the blame for insufficient services on non-profits, 
the state can avoid sustainable infrastructure and long-term funding. Understanding a local 
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organization’s subordination to the government is important for analyzing how the nonprofit 
relates to the refugees under its own ordinance.  
3.3.1  Laborer 
Interviews with CSC staff indicate that their relation to refugees is influenced by the same market 
strategies to which they are subject under the federal government. Benson (2016) reports that the 
1979 congressional hearings surrounding establishment of the Refugee Act emphasized 
managerialism, which “focuses on bottom-line results, accountability, and performance, thus 
reducing costs and making agencies more cost effective. Instead of outcomes such as refugee 
wellness, appropriate transition, and successful long-term integration, policy debates [are] centered 
on minimizing costs” (Benson 2016:533-534). As such, resettlement agencies have been subject 
to top-down monitoring since the inception of a federally standardized refugee policy. To comply 
with expectations outlined in the Act, staff at the CSO attempt to create a rapidly self-sufficient 
laborer.  
The federal government provides the resettlement agency with a one-time sum of $2,075 
per refugee, $950 of which may be used for the operation of the agency. During its three-month 
case management period, the agency uses the remaining $1,125 to pay for a refugee’s apartment 
and furnishings, an initial “culturally appropriate meal,” and fees for documentation such as a 
Social Security card. The federal money does not stretch far. Jane explains that the cheapest 
monthly rent is $500, so it is impossible to pay three months of rent (let alone other basic 
necessities) for a single refugee. The cost of the plane ticket a refugee uses to arrive in the US must 
also be repaid. To prolong the amount of time funded, resettlement agencies try to settle their 
clients in low-income housing areas and register them for SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program). In addition, the Allegheny County Department of Human Services funds a 
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six-agency partnership designed for service coordination and connecting all migrants to 
community resources. Yet the financial stability of refugees remains precarious. Consequently, the 
staff members emphasize financial self-sufficiency as the primary goal for refugees. This balance 
of providing humanitarian aid while ensuring self-sufficiency mirrors Sivanandan’s sober analysis 
in Refugees from Globalism: “We judge our duties and responsibilities to others not by what is 
owed to them, but by what it costs us” (Sivanandan 2001:90).  
The language used by agency staff and in CSC programming also offers key insight into 
dominant notions of refugee subjectification. As VanDijk (2001) explains, critical discourse 
analysis examines “the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (Schiffrin, et al. 
2001:352). Indeed, the language used in the CSC emphasizes market-based strategies. The agency 
implicitly defines a consumer relationship between itself and the refugee by calling its programing 
‘services’ and addressing refugees as ‘clients’. Services the agency offers in addition to case 
management are aimed primarily at employment rather than language attainment or cultural 
orientation. In addition, refugees are not educated about workers’ rights or labor unions, further 
highlighting that the market strategy promotes the figure of a compliant, hard-working refugee 
who quietly endures poor or rights-violating conditions.  
Overemphasizing economic self-sufficiency can appropriate civic and community 
engagement towards the goal of financial self-sufficiency, rather than valuing them as activities 
that foster belonging and participation. It furthermore reduces refugees’ full personhood to 
economic productivity. For example, resettlement agencies often encourage a refugee’s social 
network for the purpose of being resourceful within the community and securing financial 
independence. This is evidenced in the agency’s reliance on charity from often religious and ethnic 
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communities to supplement insufficient federal funds. Civic engagement can also be appropriated 
for the goal of self-sufficiency, as more fully described in the subsequent section (3.3.2). In short, 
refugees are encouraged to apply for citizenship to gain access to certain safety-net benefits.  
These examples illustrate the primacy of the laborer figure in refugee subjectification. A 
study conducted at the US base of one of the world’s largest international refugee resettlement 
agencies concluded that “resettlement organizations both enable better material realities for 
refugees, while also producing economic subjectivities and proliferating neoliberal values” 
(Dykstra-DeVette 2018:179). Systems focusing on financial independence often adopt the term 
“empowerment” to package economic self-sufficiency in a word suggesting strength, 
independence and self-determination. Yet this language itself is one of neoliberal and humanitarian 
agendas, and can carry the tension of paternalistically bestowed capacity. The fixation on 
economic self-sufficiency furthermore neglects other indicators of agency. This omission is 
intentionally employed to promote a particular refugee subject. Sharma (2008:20) explains: “under 
neoliberalism, empowerment has quickly become a preferred tool with which to produce self-
governing and self-caring social actors, orient them towards the free market, direct their behaviors 
toward entrepreneurial ends, and attach them to the project of rule.”  
It is important to note, however, that this emphasis on the laborer figure is initiated on the 
federal level. Local organizations are compelled to enforce it due to their own instability and 
dependence on government funding and philanthropy. It is thus often the host community and local 
organizations that experience the greatest strain to accommodate new arrivals with scarce federal 
support. Besteman’s (2016) ethnographic research of Somali Bantu refugees in Maine illustrates 
the response of civil servants and social workers who work in taxing environments and recognize 
the constraining structural conditions. Jane at the CSC, for example, acknowledges that the 
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expectations placed on refugees are impossible for some. She admits: “I talked about the three 
months—and yes I push it for every client. But do I personally think that it's too short? Yes. Can 
you accomplish what you need to accomplish in three months? No.” Yet this reality seems to be 
accepted with fatalistic resignation: 
I think the challenge is also just wanting to do as much as you can and seeing clients still  
fail. Knowing that you're doing everything you can, but maybe that family is not ready.  
And maybe they won't be ready. Sometimes you do everything you can do and it's just  
not enough. And that's really hard to see. And it's hard to accept that it's not your fault, it's  
not the client’s fault, it's just the circumstances around their situation…. We have clients  
where they will never be out of that crisis zone, ever. 
 
The word “failure” indicates an inadequacy on the part of the actor—the refugee—despite 
Jane’s statement that it is neither the client’s nor the agency’s fault. Jane shared the story of a 
particular client, a single mother with seven children. Her husband was killed shortly before the 
family’s resettlement to the US: 
And when she came here, she flatlined. She had no idea. She has lost all her ability to  
parent. She lost her ability to keep her house clean. She lost her ability to engage people.  
She was in the stupor the whole time. 
 
After two years in the US, this single mother is still in the same condition. Despite her 
previous comment, Jane points out the mother’s inadequacy:  
She doesn't fully grasp of that she needs to contribute at least something. She thinks she  
can apply for disability and then everything will be fine, but it's not really working out for  
her. And she seems to blame the agencies and everyone else who's working with her.  
 
Jane’s frustration with the situation was palpable, and further evidenced in the frequent 
shifting of whose responsibility it is. A few moments later, for example, Jane candidly states the 
inadequacy of the resettlement framework to help the single mother:  
We see that the system we've created for her is just not enough for her. And it will never 
be enough. And it is just hard to see that because a lot of our clients will never be safe until 
their children can be the ones who are providing for them. Their children are going to be 
the ones who are going to assimilate and learn the language and learn the financial system 
and learn the banking system, and that's when that family will be okay…. The systems are 
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against her. And until something either happens with her or her family can provide for her 
more, nothing can change. 
 
This mix of helplessness in a cruel system, hopelessness for a “crisis zone” family, and 
criticism of a “failed” refugee illustrates the tug-of-war in which local agencies find themselves. 
Pressure from the federal government demands they enforce the self-sufficient laborer figure and 
blame those who fail. Yet the humanitarian bent to this line of work and personal interaction with 
clients seem to lend greater understanding and empathy for the complex factors preventing 
independence. Still, the staff’s awareness of the system breeds a degree of resignation and 
acquiescence, as evidenced by the appropriation of citizen and neighbor figures to promote self-
sufficiency.   
This somber acceptance is reflected in Malkki’s (1996) essay on refugees from Rwanda 
and Burndi living in Tanzania. De-politicizing and de-historicizing refugees into passive objects 
of aid can make humanitarian interventions seem an inevitable, natural response to refugees, who 
are often similarly characterized in nature-terms as an unescapable “miserable sea of humanity.” 
(377). Malkki (1996) describes the “ almost laboratory-like, tragic clarity of view into the larger 
question of humanitarian intervention” (390) displayed in mass forced migration. Indeed, as the 
CSC workers describe, they system’s flaws are evident. Yet a restructuring of the process seems 
as impossible as reversing a current’s flow.  
3.3.2  Citizen 
Resettlement agency discourse and activities indicate that refugees should interact with the 
government by becoming compliant, non-demanding citizens. This is partially driven by the 
organization’s acknowledgement of citizenship as a goal of refugees. In this sense, an agency can 
adapt its goals not only towards federal priorities, but also towards refugee priorities. As Kate puts 
it: 
 44 
In the time that I've been working here, three of my co-workers have become citizens who 
came here as refugees, and my boss became a citizen. He did not come here as a refugee, 
he came here on a student visa and stayed on a work visa, but seeing what it means to them 
I guess helps. Especially seeing how much it meant to my boss. You get the right to vote, 
something that we as Americans take for granted. How many Americans showed up to vote 
in the last election? Pathetic. But that is their pride and joy. Being able to vote for the first 
time in your life in the United States is really powerful for them. Because of their country, 
where they came from, they weren't able to vote. As refugees they weren't able to vote, and 
if they were, in Syria for example, the current leader’s father was the leader, the president. 
They come from places that have no voting rights or so much corruption that it doesn't 
matter. Yes, absolutely, citizenship is goal number one. 
 
Yet the citizen-figure remains deeply connected to the laborer figure. Kate describes how 
the CSC appropriates a refugee’s goal of citizenship to promote the agency’s primary goal of self-
sufficiency: 
Citizenship is a goal for everyone. And I think that’s something we, the resettlement 
agencies, need to talk about sooner. But it just seems so far off. Refugees are able to apply 
for citizenship at year five. So we talk about that initially, and we talk about it from an 
employment standpoint and an ESL standpoint. We remind clients that, I know it's hard to 
think about now, but five years from now you need to take your citizenship class and your 
test, and you need to be ready for that. So we're constantly encouraging clients to think 
about that, especially because there are certain benefits that are dependent upon citizenship, 
Social Security being one of them. If you're a seventy-five-year-old refugee and you get 
SSI benefits through Social Security, if you don't naturalize by year seven, those benefits 
are cut off. If that is what provides for you and supports you, that is a lifeline for you to be 
able to sustain your life here. So we're really working with clients to keep that in the back 
of their minds. 
 
This illustrates Ong’s (2016) argument that the privatized and marketized context in which 
resettlement agencies such as the CSC operate “(dis)articulates citizenship,” by which 
“components formerly tied to citizenship—rights, entitlements—are becoming disarticulated from 
one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote an economic logic in defining, 
evaluating, and protecting certain categories of subjects and not others” (16). Benson (2016) 
furthermore argues that “as outsiders and as would-be citizens still in formation, refugees were 
perhaps taken for granted as not fully deserving, and their rights and entitlements were assumed 
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to be conditioned upon their obligations and duties to the state. Refugees’ relation to the social 
state was thus contractualized in the first place, and vulnerable to commodification” (543).  
3.3.3  Neighbor 
Interviews with Jane and Kate indicate that a refugee is expected to interact with the host society 
by seeking assistance from a social network when needed (family, friends, and an ethnic or 
religious community) rather than expecting federal aid. Community engagement is thus 
encouraged for the purpose of ensuring a social-based rather than federal-based safety net.  
Complementing their emphasis on a refugee’s financial independence, agency staff 
frequently mentioned refugee characteristics (or deficiencies) that hinder resettlement by violating 
the expectation of an assimilating, inconspicuous neighbor. These barriers include lack of 
education, unrestrained cultural practices, and inappropriate expectations. Refugees should adapt 
to local customs to avoid drawing attention or causing disruption. Jane, for example, recounted 
stories of refugee families clogging sinks with fish scales and rice or slaughtering a chicken in 
their driveway. She also described needing to “explain everything” to refugees from low-educated 
backgrounds or under-developed regions. Tutorials include using appliances, adjusting the 
thermostat, housekeeping, and food storage. Jane additionally explains teaching “concepts that we 
help clients to wrap their mind around,” such as paying rent or not sending a friend to work for 
you if you are sick.  
The deficiency regarded as most severe, though, is that of inappropriate expectations. This 
includes requesting a TV or microwave and wanting employment as a lawyer or professor. The 
desire for unaffordable commodities or an esteemed profession does not fit into the worker ideal, 
which necessitates that the exploitable laborer work for survival, not comfort or status. This is not 
necessarily a personal opinion of the agency staff. Rather, they are compelled by the restrictive 
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federal system to ensure that refugees understand their place in society so they can subsist after 
the first three months of aid. Jane explains that this involves a reality check for the refugees: 
It's been entertaining to say the least. We're trying, we're trying very hard. They're also 
trying us. And I love this job, I love working with the clients, but we spend a lot of time 
bringing the clients back down. 
 
The attention to correcting deficiencies intensifies into an evaluation of refugees as either 
‘good’ or ‘difficult’ clients. This frequently depends on their reflection of a hardworking laborer, 
non-demanding citizen, and inconspicuous neighbor. Jane described good clients as those who 
accept any job and housing. Difficult clients, in contrast, had higher expectations or goals that 
needed to be managed.  
The Burmese and the Nepali overall have been tremendously easy to work with. They were 
willing to take any job. They were willing to live in most any place for at least a year…. 
When you're coming from a camp setting, if you're Somali and lived in a camp for twenty 
years, you know what a refugee camp is like, you're accustomed to cooking over a fire and 
maybe living in a hut. Housing is not your biggest concern. If the housing is not perfect, 
that's okay because it is a house. Same with the Bhutanese and Burmese. But the Iraqis 
were coming from a very westernized society where they had money, they had cars, they 
had apartments. And for them to come here and have to take the bus and consider a job as 
a housekeeper, there was a lot of blow back. That was a very challenging population to 
work with in that regard. We spend a lot of time explaining why you can't be a lawyer here 
yet. Or how we can help you with that, but that that is a dream goal and right now we're 
working on survival. And we had a lot of pushback about the lack of cars and TVs and 
microwaves and computers provided--and none of that is on the list of what we are 
obligated to provide, obviously.  
 
This evaluation indicates that the US resettlement framework establishes livelihood 
standards in comparison to the poorest country of origin conditions. Unstable housing (Bhutanese 
refugees told me they rebuilt their huts every few years) is the standard, so any apartment in the 
US is considered better than that, and therefore sufficient. Unemployment is made the standard, 
so unskilled labor is sufficient. Refugees are expected to be thankful for work that offers little 
opportunity for upward mobility or professional growth. Flowing from this assumption is the 
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evaluation that refugees who accept these conditions as sufficient are considered good, and those 
who do not are difficult.  
Expectations regarding comfort or social status are thus rejected by the US resettlement 
framework when they conflict with the primary laborer figure. This finding is echoed by Bridget 
Anderson’s (2013) claim that state policy categorizes immigrants as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on their 
community value. The good migrant embraces the ideal of self-sufficiency, whereas the bad 
migrant is dependent on welfare.  Similarly, in her study of Filipino migration to Canada, Pauline 
Barber (2008) found that the “ideal migrant” was one who adapted to the neoliberal regime, for 
example through sacrifice and willingness to work long hours without complaint about issues such 
as labor code violations (Gardiner Barber 2008). In another Canadian study, Shpaizman (2010) 
confirms that free market policies are designed to construct a self-reliant and self-sufficient 
immigrant. Milner and Wojnarowicz (2017) would likely describe the Iraqis’ desire for 
employment commensurate with their skills as an everyday expression of resistance to productive 
power. Rather than accepting the ideal refugee laborer figure, they “contest the categorization of 
their identities as passive, victim-like, non-violent, and compliant” (Milner and Wojnarowicz 
2017:12). 
In summary, the local CSC defines resettlement primarily as an embodiment of the laborer 
figure, while that of a citizen or neighbor is secondary. When asked at which point a refugee can 
be considered ‘resettled’, Jane responds by saying that successful resettlement is evidenced when 
the refugee no longer needs the agency’s help:   
I think the point where a refugee reaches resettlement, is the point where they stop coming 
back to you. People always ask me, what's the best part about one of these jobs? And I 
always think, sad as it is, when I don't see clients anymore. Because they're not coming 
back to the office anymore because they don't need anymore. To me, that's when the client 
has reached a settlement. They could live the rest of their life even without citizenship, 
even if they never get the Green Card, because their initial visa that let them into the country 
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lets them stay forever. You don't have to get your Green Card or be naturalized, you just 
don't have the rights in there in terms of voting or whatever. To me, a client has reached 
resettlement when they are self-sufficient not to come back to you anymore. They're 
working, they are learning the language, they are providing for their family. That is the 
goal of resettlement. Naturalization is a secondary goal, and I would say that is more of a 
personal goal for a lot of our clients, and in a lot of cases it doesn't have that much to do 
with resettlement. It's such an afterthought. 
 
From the CSC perspective, the primary aim of resettlement is economic self-sufficiency. 
Citizenship and its implications are discussed almost flippantly (“voting or whatever…such an 
afterthought”). Community integration, a social network, or sense of belonging are not mentioned 
at all. Within this framework, financial independence (fulfillment of the laborer figure) is the 
foundation for eventual civic and community engagement (fulfillment of the citizen and neighbor 
figures). This, in turn, devalues refugees’ goals of citizenship and community.  
3.4 Bhutanese Refugees 
Is the US refugee regime successful in imposing these citizen, laborer and neighbor figures to 
create its ideal refugee subjectivity? To evaluate this, it is important to understand the refugees’ 
self-subjectification. To what degree do they conform to, appropriate, or resist the ideals of a 
laborer, citizen, and neighbor established by the state and perpetuated by the local organization? 
Interviews with Bhutanese refugees in Pittsburgh highlight how their experience with the 
US reception system has adjusted their expectations to incorporate the compliant, hardworking 
laborer mold into their subjectivity. They additionally conform to the non-demanding citizen ideal 
by seeking community rather than federal support. Subtle resistance is evident, though, in their 
acknowledgement of the laborer figure as imposed rather than self-evident. They have furthermore 
educated themselves about workers’ rights. Finally, they resist the assimilating, unassuming 
neighbor figure by isolating as an ethnic community to preserve their language and culture.  
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3.4.1  Laborer 
A striking common feature in each interview with the Bhutanese refugees was repetition of the 
word “self-sufficiency.” Their discussion is a mirroring of what they believed was expected of 
them. The interviews, described below, indicate that this discourse is not an inherent aspect of 
resettlement; in fact, it contrasts with the informants’ initial expectations. The receiving nation’s 
reception framework may thus play a significant role in shaping a refugee’s actions, but not 
necessarily desires. The interviewed Bhutanese understand the American system and seem to 
accept it as their fate. This reflects the “pulling oneself up by the bootstraps” ideal to take 
responsibility for one’s own future rather than demand institutional change.   
For example, Sangay, who works at the Bhutanese Community Group, describes the 
system’s expectation yet individual challenge of immediate employment: 
Within two months, less than two months I think, I had to start going in to work…I think 
that was too fast…Even before I knew anything about America…. I would say at least for 
two years, that kind of support is needed. 
 
Sangay further describes that he did not initially understand the rationale for immediate 
employment despite being compelled to abide by it. He explains his current understanding that the 
justification is based on stipulations of the state and federal grants. This top-down regulation gives 
him little hope for substantial changes unless it occurs at the federal level:  
 I guess I did not know that was a requirement of the mass grant. They have these different  
 benefits for different categories of clients depending on whether they are employable or  
 not. And based on one of the conditions of the mass grant, I think, I’m supposed to start  
 working immediately, otherwise they would even reduce the benefits I was receiving…. I  
 was compelled to go to work…. I will not say that they have to pay every bill, and I know  
 that the resettlement agencies also have to work on the grants, right? The state or federal  
 grants. And it is partly to do with federal laws or state laws. But, unless there is a change  
 in the general policy, I don’t see that there is any hope of having that kind of support for  
 the refugees for a long time. 
 
 50 
 Dorji, a fellow employee at the BCG, likewise reasons that the local resettlement agency 
is operating under the jurisdiction of the federal government: 
The resettlement agencies definitely go with the job first. Because they have the budget for 
the new arriving families for two to three months, so they need to get a job within that 
month…. Maybe they have some kind of contract with the welfare department and all, so 
after a certain period, they have to find a job. There may be some kind of warning with the 
agencies, with the welfare department of the state, so they have to follow their own rules 
first.… I don’t think they are wrong in doing that, because they are also bonded with some 
other agency, other government agencies, so they don’t want to see the new people coming 
here just loitering around. They want to find some job for them.  
 
Dorji’s uncertainty in exactly why refugees are pressured to work soon after arrival again 
highlights the disconnect between institution and individual. His reasoning is rooted in an 
understanding of the system as hierarchical; he as a refugee is subordinated to the agency, and the 
agency in turn is subordinated to federal institutions. Given the federal governance of refugee 
resettlement, Sangay contrasts the condition of refugees under the US framework to that of 
refugees in countries functioning under different policies: 
When you compare…the United States policy, we have to find a job quickly. We have to 
be independent very fast. We have to do a lot of things but our counterparts in Australia or 
Canada, they are depending on the government services, and we are pretty on our own in 
America…. It’s because of the law, I guess. The system. The law that everyone is supposed 
to achieve independence quickly. But not everyone is able to be independent so fast—
unless they learn the stuff properly. 
 
Sangay’s critical reflection and comparison to his counterparts in other countries indicates 
that the rapidly self-sufficient laborer figure is not an innate element of resettlement policy. Rather, 
the US framework is unique in this manner. More significant than its singularity, this focus is 
inadequate. As Sangay describes, not everyone can meet the expectation of swift self-sufficiency.   
 Despite pressure to find a satisfactory job—a job that satisfied the expectations of financial 
independence—the refugees I interviewed still strove to find a fulfilling job. Shields (2003) argues 
that the free market complicates the workforce integration of refugees, including for those with 
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high human capital assets, and leads to poorer economic outcomes. As such, refugees are often 
restricted to low-skilled labor. Sangay affirms: 
 The first job is a very unpleasant shock for everyone…. My first job was not my preferred  
 job…that was my first ever experience of working in the United States with a lot  
 of…traumatic experiences that I underwent. 
 
Still, the refugees interviewed emphasized their desire to find a job they could enjoy and 
do well. Dorji, for example, moved to Pittsburgh in 2011 in search of job opportunities after having 
been resettled in Virginia two years prior. He has held five or six jobs, including as a caretaker and 
an employee of a global investment company. He describes his first job as a motel receptionist in 
Virginia as the hardest of his life: 
Most of the time, it would be a call from the customer on their way—'where is the [motel]?’ 
So I would give them the address. ‘Ok, how do I get there?’ And there was the problem. I 
don’t know how to get there; I don’t know that navigation. Most of what I said they didn’t 
understand, and what they said I didn’t understand. So, I left that job. I didn’t like that. 
Where I don’t feel comfortable, or when the client doesn’t feel comfortable and has some 
problems, both sides don’t feel comfortable. 
 
 Dorji’s decision to leave the job indicates that work conditions play a role in fulfilling the 
self-sufficiency expectation. Resettlement agency staff had described “good” clients as those who 
accept any job, but refugees can resist this demand by not accepting distressing work conditions. 
Dorji next applied for a school janitor position. Among 15 applicants, he was chosen. That 
accomplishment gave him more fulfillment than his previous jobs: 
 I was so happy in that time. I was the happiest man that I got that job…I felt like I am  
 independent—like I can do something here now. 
 
Here, Dorji describes his satisfaction in being selected among other candidates to do work 
in which he felt confident. He enjoyed the physical labor and the fact that he did not have to 
converse with customers or explain a route. Confidence gave him independence, not a paycheck. 
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Not once did he compare the salary of these positions. He explains, “From my perspective, 
everyone who is satisfied with their job feels independent. They can do everything.” 
Neten, the refugee who worked as a private school teacher in Nepal, similarly maintains 
that the most difficult part of resettlement was “finding a job that is of interest to you, or is related 
to what you had prepared for.” 
 Dima, a fellow Bhutanese refugee, likewise struggled through her first job. She arrived in 
Pittsburgh in 2009 with her husband and parents. She began working at a laundromat within the 
first month, a position that the resettlement agency had arranged for her. Consequently, Dima 
explains, she did not have time to take ESL classes. She describes:  
 When I got my first job, I was so frustrated. Honestly, I am telling I never did this job  
 before..., I had never worked before like an entry-level job. I was very weak at that time,  
 and my supervisor, every time he complained, “she didn’t work well.” And I was so  
 frustrated, I didn’t have any options to do. Because English is our second language and I  
 was very new.  
 
Dima was frustrated with her first job because she felt she could not do the work well, and 
her supervisor was displeased. She later enrolled in three months of professional training and found 
a job as a nursing assistant, a position in which she feels stronger and more confident.  
The interviewed Bhutanese refugees highlight further challenges they confront when 
compelled to fit the compliant, hardworking laborer figure. These included their own high 
expectations, unfamiliarity with concepts of financing yourself, and lack of knowledge about 
workers’ rights. Sangay describes:  
 Naturally, when we come over, before we fly over, expectations are very high about what  
 America will be. But they don’t see the day-to-day issues and problems. That you have to  
 get up every morning and support your family, pay your bills. Over there, we simply sat  
 and ate like pigs. Even though we were not fed a nutritious or balanced diet, we didn’t do  
 anything. Some of us had a background in education and volunteered in the camp, to teach  
 our younger kids. But most of us didn’t have anything. We didn’t have legal authority to  
 go out of the camp. So we depended on the food which was supplied by agencies. So we  
 didn’t have to work for our own food. We didn’t have to pay for utility bills, pay for the  
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 rent. So when you come here, you have to do all those things by yourself. Pay for your  
 bills, for each and everything. So that is something that people never expect before they  
 come here…the challenge is that the day to day challenges are not told to the  
 people during the orientation. They just say: “this is the school system, this is the hospital  
 system….” 
 
Thus, a key factor complicating the adjustment of refugees was lack of education about 
what was expected of them. Practical training in terms of navigating the education, healthcare, and 
transportation systems was provided, but the expectation of refugees to be financially independent 
was not made clear. After 20 years of camp life, it was a shock to suddenly have bills to pay. 
Neglecting to teach refugees about workers’ rights did, however, implicitly teach the expectation 
of a compliant laborer. Sangay further explains:  
There isn’t much help that you can get in terms of education. I know they provide 
orientation, but not to the degree I expect them to do. They just provide basic information 
about how to ride a bus, where are the bus stops, how to use the bus pass. Right? Those 
kinds of things, and how to use the gas stove at home and appliances. Those are not 
necessary I guess; I think people learn by themselves. But there are other things that people 
need to be told about. Around the workplace, employment. They need to make them aware 
about the rights of the employees. We had a lot of problems with people especially in the 
community. When they suffer, they don’t even report to the employers. When their rights 
are violated, they don’t report. They are afraid. Now those kinds of things are not done 
properly by the resettlement agency I would say—the education part. 
 
Sangay further explains the challenging work environment he personally experienced due 
to a lack of training regarding expectations and protections in the workplace:  
The job itself was not a bad thing for me. But I had other problems at the job site—like not 
enough knowledge about American workplace, laws, regulations, the rights of employees. 
Those kinds of things affected in the beginning. And it was a shock because of that. So I 
had a hard time coping because of that. Because I was not aware about the rights and 
responsibilities. What I should do, certain situations, those kinds of things…. This country 
is based on a lot of rules and regulations, which we were not aware of or familiar with 
outside of America. We never lived in such an environment. We lived in the refugee camps 
for a long time, and we worked as volunteers. So there was no conception of OSHA 
[Occupational Safety and Health Administration] or those kinds of state laws or federal 
laws that protect employees…. And even after arriving here as a refugee, to start a new 
life, none of us were aware about what are the rights of the employees. And what we should 
do in case of problems and issues with the employer or coworker. Even after one year when 
I was in that job, I wasn’t aware yet. So that transition was very difficult in that first year 
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into that job, very difficult…. [The resettlement agency] did not explain any details about 
rules, workplace, protection for the rights, union thing, what a union means…so later on I 
came to know there are different ways that unions work in different workplaces. And there 
are some workplaces that have mandatory overtime, like where I worked in the first place. 
There are some places where the union does not allow that. And I was not aware of that. 
 
The fact that the interviewed refugees were taught to work without being educated about 
their rights highlights the disembodiment of labor. Workers are valued for their contribution to 
self-sufficiency, but their value as rights-bearing human beings is disregarded. This negligence 
made Sangay’s inaugural year and job in the US particularly challenging.  
Abhaya, who is married to Neten, likewise affirmed the lack of education about workers’ 
rights: 
People don’t speak up. Some people get hurt at work, they think it’s their mistake and take 
it. But it’s not their mistake. Sometimes they get hurt at work and need to report it. So what 
we teach our youth, for example—even if they get a slight thing, if there is blood, they 
need to tell the supervisor so that some first aid is applied. But the adults who just get the 
first job, they don’t have that knowledge, so they don’t report. After, when the complication 
arises, for example when you sprain your finger and you don’t report, but then after a few 
weeks your finger is swollen and you see some signs, and then you report, then the 
employer will not believe you, or it is too late. So adult workers need to be educated in all 
that.  
 
Abhaya’s explanation illustrates the implications of deficient workers’ rights education. 
Health complications arising from an unreported injury can, for example, ultimately hinder self-
sufficiency when an unattended injury worsens and impairs work. The long-term effects of 
neglecting labor rights are thus secondary to the immediate goal of ensuring financial 
independence.  
Dawa, the most recent arrival of those interviewed, came to Pittsburgh in 2014 and does 
not have citizenship. When asked if the CSC educated him on workplace expectations and worker 
rights, he replied: “Yeah, they taught us everything…how can we get a job, how we have to 
struggle for that job. They taught us everything before” (italics added). Dawa contrasted the 
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American workplace with that in Bhutan, saying that attendance is the most important factor here. 
To explain how he discovered this information, he says, “I found that out by myself. I saw that 
many friends, when they don’t come to the job, they get fired. Attendance is essential. Then the 
boss will do the best for us, they will do good.” He further explains that, unlike in Bhutan, he 
cannot send a friend in to work for him if he is sick. Dawa’s perspective confirms that he was 
taught to work hard—struggle, even—in order to find and maintain a job. Yet he does not mention 
information on labor rights.  
Dima similarly explains the training she received for her first job at the laundromat, which 
starkly evidences a focus on efficient labor rather than worker wellbeing: 
Only the lady from [a resettlement agency], the job provider, took me there and filled out 
all the forms. At that time, I spoke a little English, and she didn’t find a translator there. So 
she took me down there to show me the laundry, to wash clothes like this and fold like this, 
and put the washcloth in the machine and that will fold automatically…. She showed me 
that job in half an hour and after that she left me, and I started working there…. It was a 
very hard time…in one hour, we have to put nine hundred towels in. But I was so skinny, 
I was only ninety-four pounds at that time, and I only put in six hundred to six hundred 
fifty in one hour. And my boss every time complained to me: “you didn’t work well, you 
didn’t work well.” And I was so, when I came home, I was so stressed because I had never 
had that job before in my country. And after that my boss is not satisfied with me. And the 
place was new and all the people were new and I was so frustrated. I think that was my 
worst job.  
 
The type of training provided by resettlement agencies highlights their priority. Dawa was 
taught to struggle to obtain and hold a job. Dima was taught the duties of her job in half an hour 
without an interpreter. Her physical ability to complete the task was not considered. She, like 
Dawa, was expected to struggle without complaint. Indeed, the refugees interviewed were not 
informed of how to address workplace issues, thereby delegitimizing their right to do so.  
These stories support the conclusions of a study conducted in another US-based 
resettlement agency. Researchers found that “during job club, training and orientation, little time 
is spent acknowledging the ways that refugees are constrained by racism, sexism and classism” 
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(Dykstra-DeVette 2018:189). In addition, while it is made clear that a refugee laborer must become 
rapidly self-sufficient, little training was provided regarding expectations in the actual workplace. 
This neglect separates the laborer from their labor. A refugee should work to earn money for their 
labor, but their experience as an individual, human worker is devalued. Kearney (1991) describes 
it as such: “Migration policy/policing and resistance to it is thus a struggle for the value contained 
within the personal and social body of the migrant” (63). Indeed, the US resettlement framework 
evaluates refugees based on their economic contribution rather than the civic and social aspects of 
their personhood, or even simply by their innate value as human beings.  
The pressure to begin working within a few weeks of arrival also prevents refugees from 
enrolling in English courses. Sangay expressed his frustration with the dual expectation of 
becoming both financially self-sufficient and proficient in English, and the inability to fulfill both. 
When compelled to choose, refuges must comply with what the resettlement agency requires of 
them. Sangay explains: 
That’s the problem. They give priority to the work, employment—not to those classes. So 
they say this is important for us to learn—but at the same time they would say going to 
work is more important.… And then we have to manage those classes on our own, and it 
doesn’t work. So, I wake up in order to go to that job. I use the public transit so I have to 
wake up in the morning at about five o’clock to get to the job at seven o’clock, right? So, 
when I return home, it will already by dark. Where is the time to go to those classes? 
 
This evidences that priority is given to labor rather than language acquisition. Still, Sangay 
feels pressure to meet unmanageable demands. He initially attributed this unrealistic expectation 
to the resettlement agency. Later, he again acknowledges the top-down factors regulating the 
agency, saying “It’s because of the law, I guess. The system. The law that everyone is supposed to 
achieve independence quickly.” 
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Abhaya remarks that another challenge to fulfilling the self-sufficient laborer ideal is lack 
of experience. Even if you have skills, she explains, you lack credentials. Abhaya describes, for 
example, what happened when a resettlement agency asked her to volunteer with them:  
 I went to volunteer, and some people were interested in me to give a job, but then they  
would never give me a job because I had no job experience here. Everywhere I went, they  
would say “oh, you have good English, bla, bla” but they would not give me the job.  
And eventually I found a job at one of the departmental stores where prepared food is also  
available—like Giant Eagle. So my first job was in the prepared food section…. Not having  
an employment history here…that was the biggest barrier; nobody wanted to give me a  
job.... After my first job, I had no problem finding other jobs. 
 
Similar to the incompatibility of becoming financially self-sufficient while also pursuing 
proficiency in English, Abhaya is describing the conflict of obtaining a job without an employment 
history. Although she had the skills to volunteer with the agency and proved her value to the 
organization, a lack of formal credentials forced her to take a lower-skilled position that did not 
match her proficiencies.  
3.4.2  Citizen 
The hardworking laborer figure who does not demand rights is complemented by that of a non-
demanding citizen with limited relation to the government. The Bhutanese refugees’ interaction 
with the government in daily life is limited; little direct federal oversight exists over their 
individual case. Rather, federal regulation is mediated through the resettlement agency. Despite its 
circuitous supervision, the interviewed refugees were very aware of the government’s role in 
shaping the agency’s practices and thereby their own lives. Sangay compares his own condition as 
a refugee in the US to that of his counterparts in other countries, ascribing their differences to 
distinct federal policies: 
Unless there is a change in the general policy, I don’t see that there is any hope of having 
that kind of support for the refugees for a long time. For instance, there is a difference in 
terms of resettlement policies in Australia or Canada compared to the United States. So the 
refugees who go there get support for a long time. Like, they have a lot of language, they 
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learn their English or whatever language proficiency they have, and then skills, training 
skills, employment skills, before they can be employed. The government does not push 
them to work unless they learn so many skills pretty well. Until then, they get really good 
support—financial support to pay their bills, their medical care is taken care of, everything 
is taken care of. Their food, their housing. And then they become comfortable with the 
language, comfortable with the environment, and then they have some kind of training for 
any kind of jobs, and then naturally they are better in that way. We see it. 
 
Neten confirms the limited support he experienced with the resettlement agency:  
I think their goal is limited to finding an apartment and finding a job. I think seriously they  
wouldn’t think more than that. 
 
His wife Abhaya similarly says:  
I think resettlement agencies have certain things to do. Within that three-month period of  
time they have to do limited things and then leave people—throw people out into the ocean.  
Swim or do whatever you want to do. 
 
The refugees I interviewed reason that resettlement agencies have strict goals and are held 
accountable to the government to abide by them. In a sense, this logic prevents refugees from 
critiquing the CSC directly. The resettlement agency is stuck in the system, as they themselves 
are, so it cannot be blamed. Perceiving the federal government, then, as the primary actor can 
manifest as a misunderstanding of the refugees’ expected relationship to the government. Neten 
explains: 
I had understood, but I will not say that all people understood that they will have to pay 
rent. For many refugees that did not go to school, they may have felt that “OK, the US 
government is going to take us and we are going to get everything for free.” And that turns 
out to be not true.  
 
Abhaya explains a similar misunderstanding regarding the healthcare system: 
[For] the first eight months we were here, we were given the medical insurance assistance. 
And then we felt like “Oh, every time we go to the hospital, we don’t have to pay bills.” 
But slowly it was phasing out and we had to figure out what to do next. And I think for 
even Americans it is hard to figure out what insurance to pay and where to go, to understand 
the copays and deductibles and all that. So it was difficult. 
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Neten’s last sentence reveals that, although refugee regimes tend to exceptionalize the 
experiences of refugees, non-refugees struggle with the some of the same challenges. The US in 
particular presents a difficult context of limited social support that can stigmatize welfare and other 
safety nets.  
Dorji, who works at the BCG, is one informant who refers to rights and laws throughout 
the interview. He gained this information through his own initiative, for example by attending 
college to gain bookkeeping and accounting skills. His story emphasizes that refugees must 
investigate legal information on their own rather than being provided with the information from 
the agency: 
If you want to learn about the tax laws, to IRS website, learn about the laws there. You can 
call them. You can call you municipal authority. Always go to the place if your borough 
office is nearby and see the brochures they have. So you can grab one and see. This is how 
we learn. But you should have that interest to learn…. [In America] everyone is treated 
equally by laws. Of course we have different positions in the employment, but everyone is 
treated equally here. There is no small job, there is no big job. They vary by their wage rate 
and salaries, but everyone is respected here. There are so many rights…Whether 
naturalized or by birth, I don’t think there is any difference in having the rights with these 
two…. Among that, freedom of speech and freedom to appeal. We can always express our 
feelings if we are not satisfied with something.  
 
Dorji’s understanding is unique because he sought it out himself. This highlights the US 
resettlement framework’s emphasis on a non-demanding citizen figure, complementing that of a 
compliant laborer. A refugee trained in civic engagement would be incompatible with one who 
simultaneously accepts poor working conditions.  
Still, the Bhutanese refugees continually emphasize the importance of citizenship for 
belonging, integration, and resettlement. Sangay relates this strong desire to the fact that they had 
been stripped of citizenship in Bhutan: 
All Bhutanese refugees have a dream of becoming a citizen. The reason is we were 
forcefully…our citizenship was taken away by the government of Bhutan. Even though we 
are citizens. We are legal residents, we are citizens, our forefathers were there. It was for 
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political reasons they victimized us and took our citizenship. And we lived in the refugee 
camps stateless. And we were not accepted back into the country. So we were thrown out 
by the government’s policy…. We had that bitter experience of losing our statehood, our 
citizenship rights. So for that reason, everyone—especially the Bhutanese refugees—you 
will not find anyone who does not want to be a citizen…. They feel proud to be a citizen. 
 
Neten likewise highlights the weight of citizenship:  
When the [naturalization] ceremony was going on, the officer from the USCIS led the oath. 
And my mind flashed back and forth. Bhutan, Nepal, Bhutan, and then the US. I didn’t 
belong to any country until this moment. And now I do…I was very emotional.  
 
Kanshin shares similar sentiments. A college student, he is the youngest Bhutanese refugee 
interviewed. His father was a foreign service officer for Bhutan and his mother worked in the 
public works department. The government allowed his parents to continue working, but cut the 
mother’s job to part-time position and prohibited his father from being promoted. After seeing the 
father’s juniors rise in rank despite having worked as a public servant for 17 years himself, the 
family decided to leave for Nepal. Now in America, citizenship is paramount for them. Kanshin 
explains: 
Having citizenship secures you…it protects your identity and who you are. It just shows 
you who you are. That’s the main thing. Settling here, having an identity, being a citizen, 
you can enjoy the benefits of peace of mind like other United States citizens are enjoying. 
It’s not that if you are a citizen you get extra prize money that a GreenCard holder doesn’t, 
but it just proves identity. And losing identity for eighteen to twenty years, from my 
grandparents to my parents, has definitely affected me, that I have to get citizenship. 
 
Citizenship is thus important for identity and security, which is particularly meaningful for 
the Bhutanese refugees because the loss of these factors contributed to their displacement. Another 
valuable aspect of citizenship is the right to vote. Sangay describes the lack of freedom and rights 
in Bhutan. Experiencing democracy for the first time as a voting citizen in America was an 
incredibly powerful experience: 
During the last elections, we asked people to vote. And many people voted. Not because 
they had a particular preference for the candidates, but because we pushed them to vote, 
because that was the first voting experience of our life in a democracy. 
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3.4.3  Neighbor 
In addition to finding a fulfilling job and becoming a citizen, the Bhutanese refugees I interviewed 
value community integration. Yet not many have contact with their neighbors or the American 
community outside of greeting each other or business relations. Rather, they value being a 
contributing member of their ethnic community. This reflects the corollary of the self-sufficient 
laborer ideal: the inconspicuous, yet resourceful neighbor. This partnership encourages individuals 
to rely on their social network for support if they fail at self-sufficiency. Such a pipeline eliminates 
the need for a federal safety net. The Bhutanese reflect this ideal by turning to their ethnic 
community for support. The resettlement agency reinforces this, for example by contacting 
refugees who had been resettled a few years ago to help translate for a new arrival. Sangay 
describes that he had to discover many things on his own, for example how to obtain a driver’s 
license. Now, he uses that knowledge to help other community members: 
The resettlement agency would not help you with the driver’s license thing…. They used 
to say it’s not necessary; it’s not important for you right now. That it’s not a priority. So, it 
took us one year to discover the permit office, that you have to pass the test, discover that 
you have to do a road test. It took us one year. But for anyone who comes now, they will 
discover it in one month because I will tell him…. It is a lot easier for recent immigrants, 
because the previous ones are always helping them set up things quickly. The first arrivals, 
they have a lot of struggles. Always a lot of struggles. They have to navigate a lot of things 
by themselves. And you get only limited help from the resettlement agencies. 
 
This form of helping subsequently arriving refugees was formalized in 2012, when the 
Bhutanese community established its own ethnic-based community association: the Bhutanese 
Community Group. On its website, the BCG explains that the suicide of a Bhutanese refugee less 
than a month after arrival was a major stimulus for the Bhutanese community to organize and 
begin offering services and activities. A number of the refugees interviewed worked at this 
association at the time of the interview. The organization’s activities include bilingual English 
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Language & Civic Education courses, Cultural Preservation efforts through a Parent-Child 
Cultural Club and by hosting ethnic celebrations, Senior Programming for those over the age of 
50, Career Workshops, Community Gardening, Leadership Training & Empowerment sessions, 
and Counseling Services.  
The impetus for creating this community organization and the services they chose to offer 
illustrate the gaps of the national and local resettlement framework. For example, there appears to 
be a disconnect between refugee and agency priorities regarding mental health. The Bhutanese 
were consistently praised by the agency staff as a model population for their willingness to work 
hard and not make inappropriate demands. At the same time, this community has some of the 
highest rates of mental illness and has suffered multiple suicides. Dima explains that language 
difficulties are one source of stress that she combats with meditation: 
One thing that is very difficult in America is stress. [My husband and I] had a lot of stress 
in two thousand thirteen and two thousand twelve. We went to a three days course for a 
kind of meditation mindfulness program…. And since then, we are applying it every day. 
It’s a meditation twenty minutes in the morning and twenty minutes in the evening, and 
that helps a lot to calm our stress…The main thing that causes stress is English. Stress 
comes when you don’t understand English. If they are in the workplace and don’t 
understand English, that makes people worry that if they speak, they might speak a mistake, 
and that makes people stressed.  
 
Her husband is a Bilingual Mental Health First Aid Trainer who has trained over 500 
refugee leaders, volunteers, and resettled Bhutanese across many states. This link of embracing 
the compliant, hardworking laborer model at the cost of mental health must be further explored 
and addressed. 
Abhaya also affirms that the expectations placed on them are unrealistic. She explains that 
this is due, in part, to the host country’s lack of understanding regarding a refugee’s history: 
Sometimes resettlement agencies sometimes don’t understand what these refugees have 
come with. We were asked by our employment specialist if we could work at the laundry 
in the beginning. But [my husband and I] both denied—we said we will find our own job. 
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I know it’s hard to find without having a first job. But there needs to be some sort of match 
with what people have come with—what kind of education they have. If they know how 
to match that, I think the refugee people coming in—their self-esteem will be higher and 
they will be better. 
 
Dorji likewise expresses disappointment in the lack of knowledge a resettlement agency 
has about specific populations: 
[The resettlement agency] never knew our background. So, it took like five to six months 
to understand us, to study us, to know our background. By that time, it was too late. So, 
yes, they could have done more, but it’s not their fault also. They never study our people, 
where we are from, how much education we have, what we know. 
 
These narratives illustrate that the resettlement agency’s primary objective is securing 
financial independence. The organization does not invest in understanding a particular 
population’s or individual’s history, whether due to insufficient capacity, lack of awareness, or 
other factors. Collateral damage to mental health is also not addressed. The ethnic community is 
thus important for supporting refugees not only as a financial safety net, but an empathetic, 
understanding resource.  
The Bhutanese emphasis on their ethnic community is also rooted in passion for ensuring 
cultural preservation. Kanshin, the youngest informant explains:  
Many of the people have been through lots of humiliation. They have been forced to give  
up their culture, speak different languages, get discriminated in the country where they  
speak the same language—Nepal. [The Nepali] say that they are the refugee and poor  
people, and we are the upper-class people, but they don’t realize that they are the same  
people whose grandparents had to move because of farming land opportunities in Bhutan.  
They were forced to give up their identity. So as they were taught before they moved to the  
United States, you can celebrate freedom of rights, freedom of speech, freedom of culture.  
So they have that thing in mind and know they can now celebrate their culture, religion and  
gender freely now. 
 
This community orientation is manifest in the Bhutanese refugees’ emphasis on self-
sufficiency as a community, rather than as individuals. Neten, who is employed at the BCG, 
explains: 
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Success only comes when you move in parallel with others. You move up, and if you see  
others down there, it is not success. Success is actually when you are able to move along  
with others. That is what my culture says…. Whatever I can do is not just because of my  
own effort. We have a team, and it is that team that has been able to do whatever we are  
able to do in the community. 
 
Neten says he tells the Bhutanese students in the citizenship class, who are around 55-70 
years old, “I have not gone to college in America. I have to, I am planning to, but I am only going 
after I have seen all of you becoming citizens.” 
Abhaya likewise talks about achieving success in healthy way, explaining: 
Not in a greedy way. Money is not everything…[The] healthy way is your own  
mindset. If you take your job very positively, it’s good. But not in unhealthy competition— 
like some people trying to push you down and then move forward. 
 
At the same time, this ethnic community focus and the challenge of English can cause 
isolation. Neten reasons that his focus is on the Bhutanese first. As such, his interactions with 
Americans are in the context of his community outreach with the BCG: 
My task was to find space for events…. So I started approaching libraries, the school  
districts, all those. And then as the local communities started knowing about our presence  
in the region, they started reaching out to us—asking us to get involved in their local  
community days. So that also involved us in many ways…. I didn’t do at a personal level.  
Whenever I did it, it was for [BCG]. Even though people know me personally that way,  
the relationship is with the organization…there was nothing that would relate to my  
establishing friendships with the locals at the personal level. It was only our organization’s  
needs that brought me to them, but not for personal reasons. 
 
Interacting with Americans for business reflects the first relationships Bhutanese refugees 
had with Americans: the resettlement agency staff (who refer to refugees as “clients”) and their 
employer. Subsequent interactions thus seem to be modeled on this dynamic. Abhaya further 
explains that if they want interaction with the American community, it will have to be through the 
Bhutanese community’s initiative due to the hostility or indifference she experiences from the 
native population: 
We took our own initiative. And we are still pushing that…I think Pittsburgh is not very  
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welcoming right now, but we are pushing that. We are doing a lot of intercommunity events  
where we invite American people and we go to them…but it’s a small thing. There are still  
so many people who need to know about us, and we need to know about them. We didn’t  
know much of the neighborhood, but if we were walking, people would stare and kind of  
look in a different way…And even in the bus, I feel like people would look at you with  
different eyes. I think that is common for everyone right now; I think people look at people  
wearing hijab in a different way, so it’s the dress, the way you look. We—not my family,  
but as a community—try to be as good as possible with the neighborhood and where we  
live. So we started participating in different neighborhood events…. Wherever the  
community events happen, we go there and take our kids.  
 
In addition to community separation, whether intentional or not, Neten explains the 
isolating effect of language: 
Language is still [a challenge]. Sometimes I don’t get the Americans, and sometimes I  
confuse them. One thing that I confused—just as an example to let you know. Someone  
said, “Where do you want to go if not Pittsburgh?” and I said “VErmont.” And he said  
“Oh, VermOnt?” So…I didn’t know how we read out names, where we put the stress in a  
word. So that is a silly one, there are a lot of others where I put people into embarrassment,  
or I get embarrassed. 
 
 The language barrier can create an uncomfortable situation, such that refugees do not feel 
confident in engaging in conversation with Americans. This contributes to the isolation of ethnic 
communities as well.  
 In summary, the Bhutanese refugees I interviewed accept the self-sufficient laborer ideal 
expected of them, yet demonstrate resistance through learning about workers’ rights or quitting 
stressful jobs to search for employment in which they feel confident. They reproduce the non-
demanding, compliant citizen ideal by turning to their ethnic community rather than the 
government for assistance, yet resist by valuing citizenship. Finally, they reproduce the 
inconspicuous neighbor ideal. Yet instead of rejecting their heritage to assimilate to American 
culture, they largely remain isolated as a community to satisfy the inconspicuous figure while 
preserving their identity.  
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4.0 Syrian Refugees in Berlin 
4.1 Historical Context 
Rasha is a mother of three from Damascus who lived in war for six years. Planes flew overhead 
every day. Her friend says looking up at the bombs falling from the sky was like watching a 
carnival. Rasha adds you could go out in the streets and see dead bodies or people with missing 
limbs. To calm her terrified children, Rasha would tell them the planes cannot do anything. But 
inside, she admits, she was scared, too. Rasha finally told her husband they have to leave because 
she did not want her son to be drafted into the army to kill people. Their children did not have 
school or a future in Syria anymore, she says.  
Burhan fled Syria after being held in a federal prison for two months under mistaken 
identity. His father paid a 20,000 Euro ransom to the government to free him: 
After that [the police] did an interview with me and the man from police said: “Yes, you  
can go out, because we are looking for another man.” What happened? He has the same  
last name and the same name as me…. But he is eighteen years older than me. 
 
The prison conditions, Burhan describes, were horrific: 
In one room, five or four square meters, stand forty people or more. When I want to sleep, 
one of them gets up and I sleep. Then every hour he sits and I get up. And in the corner, 
there is also a toilet and everyone can see that. And a water bottle once a day for the forty 
persons, so it is just drops. 
 
After living for a short time in Lebanon and Turkey, he resolved to continue journeying to 
Greece via a dinghy, regardless of how many times he fell into the sea: 
From Turkey to Greece I fell from the boat. And forty persons were in the sea. That did 
not work… [we tried] five times, and I fell into the sea twice. The boat is lost and I am in  
the sea. 
 
 After the fourth attempt, Burhan told the smuggler he wanted his money back. In response, 
the smuggler struck a deal with him: 
 The man said “Ok, do you want to go to Greece without money?” And I asked how? And  
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he said, “Drive the boat.” I said yes…. And then I learned everything. For six hours, from  
twelve to six o'clock in the morning. 
 
Burhan continued his journey with a group of 50 others, from Greece to Macedonia, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary by walking, swimming through rivers, and hiring drivers. The temperatures 
were so frigid that “I feel my heart is stopped. Frozen by the cold.” When officers began taking 
fingerprints in Budapest, he evaded them and took a bus to Vienna. Upon arrival, refugees were 
told they have a free train ticket to Munich. From there he traveled to the city of Bremen, then to 
France with the intent of reaching England, and finally through Denmark and Sweden to arrive in 
Norway. He lived in a small village outside of Oslo for six months before returning to Germany, 
where his asylum application had originally been filed.   
 Sayid is a law-educated former businessman and factory owner from Syria. He had not 
planned on leaving the country in which he built his life. Sayid stayed for five years after the civil 
war had erupted, “until I had absolutely nothing left.” When he did flee, it was sudden:  
 I managed a factory in the war for five years, and we didn’t stop producing. I was good at  
 my job; I am good at managing. But I couldn’t manage fleeing. There was no time for big  
 planning or thinking.  
 
 The journey with his wife and brother-in-law lasted 30 days. Their rubber boat from Turkey 
to Greece was designed for 20 people but the smuggler packed in 47, including women and 
children. Sayid says the smuggler only wanted money; he put them in the dinghy and said, “go 
alone.” After one hour, they were in the middle of the sea and could see only water: 
 We asked ourselves one question: What are we doing here? We fled death, but now we are  
 in the jaws of death. 
 
How did the circumstances compelling Rasha, Burhan and Sayid to flee evolve? During 
Ottoman rule, “Syria” was not a nation-state, but rather a collection of provinces centered around 
ancient cities such as Damascus and Aleppo and existing within a diverse and tolerant social 
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tradition. With the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the French and 
British signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement delegating to themselves spheres of influence in Middle 
East. After overthrowing a kingdom that had been established by Arab leaders of the revolt against 
the Ottoman empire rather than recognizing their independence request at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919, France made the Syria region its legal mandate and de facto colony.  In 1946, 
Syria celebrated the dismissal of the last French troops.  
Yet Western involvement and the impositions of states with no regard for existing 
organization had an undeniable legacy. Politics of the newly independent, united Syria were 
characterized by unrest and disunity until the late 1960s. Hafez al-Assad of the secular, nationalist 
Baath Party established his regime in 1970 to tackle the weakness and disunity of Syrian statehood. 
He gradually shifted from a socialist and redistributive state to a patronage-based system and 
initiated free-market policies. His son, Bashar al Assad, continued neoliberalizing policies with 
the aspiration of emulating Western wealth accumulation and being accepted into the World Trade 
Organization. Yet these measures significantly increased socioeconomic inequality. In 2010, 
Syria's per capita GDP of $2,834 was comparable to that of Sub-Saharan African countries, and 
its annual growth rate of 3.39% below that of most other developing countries. From 2006 to 2011, 
the country experienced an intense drought linked to human-caused global warming and 
exacerbated by years of centralized water mismanagement. Up to 1.5 million people participated 
in urban migration as a result, aggravating poverty and social unrest through increased food 
insecurity and malnutrition, internal displacement, and the creation of shantytowns. This evidences 
how regime choices impact the environment. In the Syrian case, neglect of rural populations and 
poor agricultural policies magnified the drought’s impact. The economic liberalization 
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unaccompanied by parallel political freedoms furthermore instigated peaceful protests and the 
subsequent civil war in 2011.  
 The UNHCR reports that 5.6 million Syrians have fled the country since 2011, with another 
6.6 million internally displaced (UNHCR 2018a). Nearly 700,000 Syrians lived in Germany in 
2017, according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt 2017). The Pew Research 
Center states that this is the fifth largest displaced Syrian population following Syria itself, Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan (Connor 2018).  
4.2 German Refugee Regime 
The German refugee settlement model is largely driven by ordoliberalism, an ideology that 
developed in 1930-1950s Germany and became the foundation of the nation’s post-World War II 
social market economy. A central tenent authorizes state power to maintain healthy competition 
and prevent unchecked freedoms leading to monopolies. It maintains strong regulation of the labor 
market. In this light, Germany has been criticized for opening its borders not out of 
humanitarianism or goodwill, but rather as an economic calculation in light of its aging population. 
President of the Bundesbank Jens Weidmann explained that Germany needs the labor force 
provided by refugees to counteract changing demographics and to uphold its current welfare level. 
Others further argue that Germany accepted the asylum of only highly educated refugees while 
rejecting less educated migrants, allowing them to place skilled individuals (such as doctors) in 
positions for which they are over-qualified (such as that of a nurse or orderly).  
Despite criticisms of this form of governance regarding asylum decisions, it is important 
to consider how this state-regulated neoliberalism continues to impact asylum seekers after their 
application has been approved. This chapter analyzes how German federal settlement policies 
define expectations for a refugee’s relation to the economy, state, and society. I argue that the 
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German refugee regime prioritizes the dependent citizen, complemented by the skilled laborer and 
multicultural neighbor figures. 
4.2.1  Laborer 
The laborer ideal promoted by the federal government for refugees is one of a skilled contributor. 
The labor market in Germany is highly regulated and difficult to enter, especially for refugees. To 
begin, asylum seekers are not allowed to work within the first three months after arrival. After that 
initial time period, they must wait until they have received a residence permit. This could involve 
months, even over a year, of waiting in a refugee camp. Once approved, refugees must complete 
a 600-hour language course. They are required to pass the B1 language level, also called the 
‘threshold’ level. It is defined by the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages 
as “the ability to express oneself in a limited way in familiar situations and to deal in a general 
way with nonroutine information. Example: Can ask to open an account at a bank, provided that 
the procedure is straightforward.” The federal government pays for the refugee’s fees, rent, and 
basic necessities for the duration of the course, which is usually about eight months. This is 
followed by an orientation course geared towards civic education. Refugees completing these 
requirements are not classified as “unemployed,” but rather as “job-seeking.” This indicates that 
these courses are considered vital for integration into the labor market. Those who were academics 
in their home country can have the B2 language course paid for as well. The government thus 
prioritizes investment in creating a skilled laborer figure.  
Unlike the US mandate that refugees should be self-sufficient within three months, there 
is no such timeline in Germany. Refugees continue receiving financial assistance from the 
Jobcenter as long as they have a residence permit and they do not have a job. The Jobcenter is a 
merger of employment agencies and social services to provide care for beneficiaries of 
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unemployment benefits, including German citizens.  Any work a refugee does obtain must be 
reported to the Jobcenter, which will subtract most of their salary from their aid package. The aid 
a refugee receives includes funds for living expenses, fees for the required education, and an 
allocation for furniture and houseware.  
This framework indicates that refugees are not expected to become rapidly self-sufficient. 
Rather, they are expected to invest in education to eventually become a skilled laborer. In the 
meantime, refugees are significantly dependent on the government. Such federal oversight 
establishes the precarity of conditional refuge, in which recipients must comply with state 
expectations to secure renewal of protection, as described below.   
4.2.2  Citizen 
In contrast to the US refugee regime’s local initiatives, the German refugee regime includes more 
direct federal oversight. Reitz (2018) argues that a federal support system helps refugees feel they 
are welcome and wanted, which he claims is crucial for integration. Pairing state funding with 
local implementation fosters community involvement, which further promotes integration 
(Richmond and Shields 2005). Dobrowolsky (2013) adds that federal welfare support and local 
settlement services are also important in motivating a refugee to remain where they were settled 
rather than relocating. Beyond feelings of belonging, government regulation of refugees in 
Germany also impacts their precarity, education, financial aid, mobility, and workforce 
integration.  
 To begin, a refugee’s asylum approval does not ensure permanent residence. The initial 
residence permit that an individual receives indicates for how long they may stay. Individuals 
granted refugee status receive a three-year residence permit. Those granted subsidiary protection 
have a one-year residence permit that is renewable for another two years, and those given 
 72 
humanitarian protection are also granted a one-year residence permit.  Permit renewal depends on 
the situation of the country of origin. If the conditions that justified initial issuance of the permit 
still exist, the individual retains their “prohibition of deportation” (Abschiebungsverbot) and the 
permit is renewed. After three years, individuals who are “outstandingly integrated” into society 
are granted a permanent residence permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis). Requirements for 
“outstanding integration” include achieving the C1 language level (one level below native speaker) 
and having the means to cover the “overwhelming part” of living costs for themselves and their 
family. If an individual does not meet these requirements after three years, they can obtain a 
permanent residence permit after five years under fewer requirements, such as achieving the A2 
language level and having the ability cover the “better part” of living costs.  
 In both cases, the home country condition is still evaluated to justify national protection. 
Refugees can apply for German citizenship after living in the country for eight years without 
interruption. This can be reduced to seven years upon completion of the integration course, and to 
six years if individuals have integrated “particularly well into society.” Individuals must also 
financially sustain themselves and their family, pass the B1 language and naturalization exams, 
and have no serious criminal offenses (Kalkmann, 2017). 
The seemingly subjective conditions of “outstanding” or “particularly well” integration, in 
addition to constant re-evaluation of host country conditions, causes great anxiety for both refugees 
and non-profit staff for the future. Furthermore, the Asylum Information Database reports that, 
upon naturalization, “in contrast to other foreign nationals, refugees are not required to give up 
their former nationality” (Kalkmann 2017:94). This magnifies the uncertainty that, even with 
German citizenship, refugees can be encouraged or compelled to return to their home country 
when certain conditions exist.   
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Antje, a staff member at the Refugee Welcome Office, fears for the refugees’ future due to 
these seemingly subjective criteria. She calls German bureaucracy a “jungle” that she does not 
fully understand, and worries that the refugees coming today have no security in their residence. 
She bases her concern in past experiences: 
After the war in Yugoslavia, it was said after ten or twelve years, "So everything is fine at  
home now, now you can go back.” …. Yes, my daughter had a girl in her class from 
Yugoslavia, she went to high school, she was intelligent, the family was nice, that was not 
a problem family at all, and they were sent back. You have to imagine this. I recently heard 
such a documentary on the radio. They will then be sent back to Serbia or something, and 
there will only be misery. She wanted to study here...and now there is only misery. Really 
bad…it'll make you feel a bit dizzy. So again, if there was an immigration law, if the family 
is self-sufficient, they must then be allowed to stay here! You must be able to get out of 
this refugee status. Whoever only looks at what is going on in the homeland, that is not 
right.  
 
Her conviction that there is no way to escape refugee is not quite correct, as it is possible 
to obtain a permanent residence permit and eventual citizenship. The case of the family from 
Yugoslavia must thus be further investigated to understand how their deportation could be 
justified. Yet Antje’s panic regarding seemingly arbitrary return to country of origin is common.  
This fear, alongside abstract requirements and elaborate bureaucracy, highlights the 
conditionality of asylum in Germany. Once an asylum plea is initially accepted, refugees must 
complete education requirements. The integration course, which combines 600 hours of language 
and 100 hours of civics education, is state-mandated and run. Refugees are required to document 
their attendance at these courses by mailing a letter signed by their teacher to the Jobcenter. If they 
do not demonstrate their attendance, their aid will be reduced. 
Furthermore, refugee mobility is regulated by the government. The German and European 
Union refugee regimes not only encourage geographic permanence, but mandate it. At the EU 
level, the Dublin Regulation mandates that the Member State through which an individual entered 
the EU is responsible for that individual’s asylum claim. In Germany, federal law requires refugees 
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to stay in the city in which they were settled, though they may travel. Federal oversight also 
impacts their workforce integration via stringent prerequisites, as described above. Together, these 
regulations comprise a relationship between refugees and the government rooted in dependence 
and management. The majority of a refugee’s livelihood is contingent on the government, 
including finances, education, employment, mobility, and assurance of continued refuge. This 
dependent relationship gives the state significant leverage to enforce a particular refugee 
subjectivity, since the individual’s fulfillment of it can determine their residence security.  
4.2.3  Neighbor 
The neighbor figure promoted by the state settlement framework is rooted in multiculturalism. On 
the one hand, this may indicate a degree of tolerance and acceptance of migrants’ heritage. For 
example, German language attainment through the 600-hour course is not accompanied by a 
requirement of strict cultural assimilation. Instead, the federal government emphasizes bilateral 
interactions with the native population to share cultures. This idea of reciprocity to understand and 
share with “the other” is mirrored by a form of multiculturalism the RCIS describes as rooted in 
social liberalism and an activist state. This state, in contrast to the neoliberal state, “willingly 
invests public resources in nonprofit organizations that engage in immigrant settlement service 
and cultural heritage expression, which give voice to underrepresented groups” (Root, et al. 
2014:6). The goal of this multiculturalism is to create “a tolerant national citizen who is concerned 
for the disadvantaged in her own society” (Kymlicka 2013:111). This stands in contrast to the 
neoliberal multiculturalism described in the US Refugee Regime chapter (3.2), which emphasizes 
the migrant’s embrace of host country values—or at least concealment of their own culture (Root, 
et al. 2014). Within the US framework, the resilient, entrepreneurial, economically beneficial 
newcomer is valued. As Kymlicka (2013) explains: “Neoliberal multiculturalism for immigrants 
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affirms—even valorizes—ethnic immigrant entrepreneurship, strategic cosmopolitanism, and 
transnational commercial linkages and remittances but silences debates on economic 
redistribution, racial inequality, unemployment, economic restructuring, and labor rights” (112).  
Still, it is important to acknowledge that cultural preservation and continued ties to the 
homeland can facilitate a sudden return to the refugee’s country of origin. This may be a recourse 
if a refugee’s residence is not renewed, for example when their home country is evaluated as safe 
for return. The fear and anxiety this possibility incites in refugees and local non-profit staff is 
described more in subsequent sections.  
In sum, the German federal government is directly involved in regulating refugee 
settlement. Refugees are expected to be invested citizens who comply with federal language and 
civic education requirements, but lack long-term assurance of their status. They are also 
encouraged to be multicultural neighbors and engage in reciprocal relations with the native 
population. The tightly regulated job market limits a self-sufficient laborer figure and instead 
strengthens refugee dependence on and thereby compliance with the government.  
4.3 Localized Refugee Regime 
Although the German government exercises significant oversight in refugee settlement, staff of 
the local Berlin organization seemed more willing to offer criticism of the national refugee regime 
than the local Pittsburgh staff. Perhaps I had established more rapport with them due to internships 
over two consecutive summers with the organization. This may also be due to the fact that the 
organization is not as dependent on precarious government aid and thus has more liberty to 
scrutinize the process.  
The local organization is called the Refugee Welcome Office (RWO). It is the project of a 
Berlin real estate company with the mandate of overseeing the settlement of refugees in two 
 76 
apartment buildings while fostering relationships among the newcomers and the German 
neighbors. From its inception, it was a time-limited initiative. The RWO staff successfully 
appealed for more funding at least twice to extend the project, but it officially closed in February 
2019 after three years in existence. The team was small, with two hired staff members in 2017 and 
three in 2018, supplemented by volunteers and interns. The office experienced a full staff turnover 
between 2017 and 2018.   
4.3.1  Laborer 
The Refugee Welcome Office staff generally supported the government’s investment in language 
acquisition prior to employment, thereby promoting the skilled laborer figure. Since refugees 
enrolled in language courses are listed as “job-seeking” or “completing requirements” rather than 
“unemployed,” and since successful completion is a requirement for employment, I address the 
language courses as part of the laborer figure. 
Antje mentions that she has not experienced a refugee obtaining work sooner than one or 
one and a half years. This was not a concerning amount of time for her; rather, she found any 
sooner than that too fast if the refugee does not yet know sufficient German. The types of jobs 
refugees obtain, she says, are unskilled labor positions, for example at the post office. Students 
may stock grocery shelves. Academics or those with a higher degree may find work as an engineer, 
for example.  
Staff did express criticism, though, of the uniform application of strict requirements 
without regard for the individual case. Antje describes this frustration from her perspective: 
I think, actually, it is right with the language requirement. But I also see that it sometimes 
fails in reality. I experience that asylum seekers, depending on the situation of an asylum 
seeker’s home country, their experiences on the journey, and the conditions at home, are 
unable to learn language. If the head is occupied, then there is no room. You can send them 
for six hundred or nine hundred or one thousand hours to language courses, but that is then 
thrown-out money. And for all who want to learn, the gap in ability in the course is so great 
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that it does move not forward…. And of course there are the people who come from the 
village and are illiterate and have no intellect to ever learn a language. A few basics would 
be good, there should be a community so they can go out and go shopping, because there 
you speak Turkish or Arabic. 
 
There were, indeed, several refugees in the neighborhood who struggled with learning the 
language. Some had stopped attending the courses all together. These individuals in particular 
were experiencing significant domestic conflicts, challenges with family reunification, and trauma 
from the brutal death of family members.  
Susanne likewise expresses frustration with the course requirements. She finds them too 
overwhelming for refugees who have fled their home country, made the journey to Germany, and 
now must become accustomed to a new country, people, language, and culture. The stipulations, 
she describes, are particularly unhelpful for refugees dealing with trauma and grief. These 
individuals, she suggest, should instead learn German through working and getting help from co-
workers. Holding a job and paying for their own expenses would also eliminate their bureaucratic 
struggle with the Jobcenter. A middle ground, she says, could be a three-month familiarization 
period, followed by either three months of a language course or three months of intense job 
seeking: 
From America as well as from Germany the decision is prescribed to the people; you have 
to do that and that. Why don’t you leave refugees the freedom to decide for themselves? 
To say, “now I want language lessons,” or “I would rather work.” And after half a year 
everybody has become acclimated to his life—but not like it is now in America or 
Germany, like a pressed sausage. 
 
A method of accommodating to the unique context and ability of each refugee would thus 
be to give them more flexibility. Rather than primarily emphasizing either employment (as in the 
US) or language attainment (as in Germany) only, refugees should be allowed to choose—and be 
supported in their decisions.  
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Gender roles play an additional discriminating role, Susanne explains, when it comes to 
capacity for learning a language: 
I do not want to protect the men now – don’t misunderstand. But they have their heads full 
because they think “we have to be able to do everything—Jobcenter, electricity....” And 
then they have no more free thoughts to learn German. The men make it hard for 
themselves but they want the women—let's say blatantly—to keep them a little bit small. 
Compared to the German women, they only need to cook, wash, iron and take care of 
children. The German woman still has to go shopping and think about what she wants to 
cook and what is needed for shopping materials, what do I want to cook tomorrow? The 
men do all that. None of the wives of the refugees has their own checking account. The 
man is responsible for the family for pretty much all aspects of life. 
 
In sum, despite a universal expectation to learn German, refugees do face challenges to 
acquiring language proficiency, whether related to gender, literacy level, or difficult life 
circumstances. Since language is seen as preparation for workforce integration, acquisition is tied 
to fulfillment of the laborer figure enforced in Berlin.  
Self-sufficiency was the primary component of the US laborer figure. In Berlin, Antje 
likewise defined self-sufficiency in terms of financial independence—when the refugees are not 
dependent on state aid anymore. When asked if she agrees with the undefined timeline for self-
sufficiency, she confirmed: 
Yes, how should one set time requirements if the external circumstances are not  
right? No. I agree on that. 
 
Susanne, in contrast, criticized how this system could be taken advantage of. She clarified, 
though, that the aid does come with conditions: 
Say you have a refugee who does not want to work. The prerequisite is that you have at 
least A-two. But if the refugee does not have an A-two level, he does not need to work. 
Ok. So, such a refugee will not learn and the time is totally in the bucket…. But they do 
have many stipulations, like writing ten job applications a month. If they do not meet this 
requirement—and the Jobcenter does random checks to see if the applications have actually 
gone out—then benefits will be canceled, canceled, canceled. 
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Susanne’s comments indicate the conditionality of German settlement. The state monitors 
a refugee’s attendance in language courses and completion of job applications in order to approve 
continued financial aid. This federal involvement in a refugee’s finances is only part of the 
comprehensive state oversight, which is further described below.  
4.3.2  Citizen 
The RWO is involved in the refugees’ relationship to the political sphere in the sense that it 
provides consultation and accompaniment to bureaucratic offices. Yet the local organization offers 
no supplementary courses or workshops geared towards civic engagement. Instead, refugees gain 
this education through the state-run orientation course. This reinforces the refugee figure of a 
knowledgeable yet dependent citizen.  
Staff did criticize aspects of the government’s policies. For example, Antje says the 
recertification process, such as for a Syrian dentist to work as a dentist in Germany, could be 
improved. Susanne argues that the orientation course, designed to teach about civics and the 
German government, is not effective. Instead, she maintains, refugees need at least a six-month 
course dedicated just to teaching German bureaucracy. She says: “Many Germans do not know 
these laws; how should these poor people know the laws?” Finally, the precarity of residence 
permits gives refugees “a very insecure attitude towards life,” as Antje says. She further explains: 
Three years sounds long, but if you now see the school education of your children or you 
learn the language for one and a half years and then you start taking the next steps, then 
three years go by very quickly. And you do not know—will you get [your residence] 
extended or not? 
 
A sense of uncertainty is mirrored in the language used to describe refugees. The German 
language has two words for “refugee,” each with a different connotation. The first, Fluechtling, is 
a noun employing the diminutive -ling ending. The same ending is used in words such as darling, 
weakling, coward, and nerd (Liebling, Schwaechling, Feigling, Sonderling). Yet some maintain 
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that this term stands on a foundation that defies attempts at appropriation. It is the designation by 
which the Geneva Refugee Convention guarantees asylum and aid. It carries historical and 
legislative weight. The second term, Gefluechtete, is a past participle used to describe a situational, 
temporary change of location. A comparative English phrase is “the fled.” As such, it is a transitory 
descriptor rather than permanent label. Some, though, argue that it represents the banalization of a 
circumstance so terrible that it forbids such trivialization. Journalist Fabian Goldmann declares: 
“We've all ‘fled’ before: from a dull family celebration, from jail or into hallucinogenic dream 
worlds. It does not make us refugees” (Goldmann 2018:x). Perhaps in light of this ambiguity, 
Berlin staff mostly refrained from using a label whatsoever, instead using the words “they” and 
“them.” When they did use a term, Susanne used Fluechtling, and the Antje used the term 
Gefluechtete. 
4.3.3   Neighbor 
Local initiatives supporting refugees emphasize the refugee figure of a multicultural neighbor. As 
mentioned, the purpose of the Refugee Welcome Office is to oversee the settlement of refugees in 
two apartment buildings while fostering relationships among the newcomers and the German 
neighbors. Regarding the former, the RWO provides accompaniment to appointments with 
government offices or physicians. It also assists in lengthy bureaucratic processes for topics 
ranging from residence renewal and family reunification to school enrollment. Community 
mediation initiatives include a weekly women’s café, men’s café, and neighborhood café.  
Acknowledging the bilateral nature of these integration efforts, staff mention challenges 
that both refugees and Germans face when relating to another. Antje explains: 
German individualism opposes Arab family culture. Arab families above all love to be with 
another and spend time with another…. But in this area live mostly seniors, so going out 
and meeting another is not a central part of life anymore and we Germans tend to close the 
front door and stay home alone. It is difficult to lure out the Germans so that they engage 
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in encounters…. On the other hand, the Arab families are very conservative in their own 
way, because they meet with people in their environment where they understand how it 
works. It's conservative, and of course it's a bit of shyness because it's not easy…. As for 
conversations with one another, I have discovered that it takes a certain amount of…how 
should I say…I do not mean intellect—but a certain flexibility, maneuvering. You cannot 
expect the refugees to approach the Germans and start a conversation. But that's not so bad. 
If you do something together, with each other, then that still creates a feeling. And that's 
enough. 
 
In her analysis, Antje addresses the reciprocity required in creating a cohesive society. She 
acknowledges the potential incompatibilities of German and Arab culture equally, thereby 
encouraging both parties to approach another with grace and flexibility.  
Antje adds that the problem is not necessarily that the communities do not accept another, 
but rather that no one initiates contact. This is why, staff explains, the RWO strives to offer the 
space and events that facilitate such interactions. These plans are geared towards activities that 
foster community through mutual support. Antje reasons:  
Relationships always work well if you do something together or do something for each 
other. So help another with the budget resolution, take out the trash, treat the sick child, 
knit as an apartment community Christmas stockings for all children in the building. That 
always works well. And eating together. That is a very important factor. 
 
Susanne offers another explanation for refugees’ hesitation to interact with Germans or 
ask them for help: 
Refugees see it this way: all Germans have helped and given them so much. They then do 
not want to ask the individual German for even more help because in their eyes this 
Germany, which belongs to all Germans, has already given so much. 
 
Antje furthermore acknowledges the fears that parents in particular may have of losing 
their values, and affirms the validity of cultural preservation: 
For the families and for the parents, I believe that a very, very difficult point is 
permissiveness in Germany. And I see a fear that the children will lose themselves in this 
permissiveness and that the families will lose their culture…I believe that in society 
integration is often confused with assimilation. That's not good, because I believe that no 
matter to which country you emigrate, you will always carry a piece of your own culture 
and mentality with you and you cannot shed it, and I do not think doing so is even desirable. 
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Antje’s belief that one should not mandate refugees to become inconspicuous, assimilating 
neighbors is important, and in contrast to the US framework.  Towards this end, the RWO 
organized both an Eid al-Fitr celebrating the end of Ramadan and a traditional German Summer 
Fest, which both refugees and German neighbors attended. In 2018, the second summer of my 
research, the RWO established monthly neighborhood culture nights that would alternately share 
elements from the refugees’ country of origin and German traditions. The inaugural event, Syrian 
Culture Night, began with a collaborative cooking session in which Syrian women taught their 
German neighbors how to make hummus, falafel, za’atar, and baklava. Cooking was followed by 
a shared meal and PowerPoint presentation prepared by two Syrian men on the country’s history 
and culture. Politics were intentionally avoided. 
As such, the RWO acknowledges both the refugee and German communities as part of 
society. Neglecting either one is dangerous, Antje says. Mandating that refugees act like they are 
not Arab anymore is impossible. Claiming that we must be tolerant and cannot criticize anything 
delegitimizes rules. A middle-ground mentality, she believes, is vital to the functioning of this 
multicultural society. A guiding phrase, she says, is, “Welcome, dear ones, we want to have you 
here, we want to help you as much as we can, but there are also certain laws here and you have to 
live with that.” 
Like the US resettlement agency, the RWO hopes to empower refugees to the point that its 
services are superfluous. This project was time-restricted from its inception, designed to support 
refugees during the initial settlement period. Its original timeline was already renewed at least 
twice, but after three years of operation the office closed in February 2019. The fact that an “initial 
reception period” extends to three years is significant, and starkly in contrast to the three-month 
period in the US. Furthermore, rather than considering empowerment as financial self-sufficiency, 
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independence was regarded more as knowledge. Towards this end, preparations for the office’s 
closure have been long in the making. Antje laid out the new Master Plan, which coordinates 
services across a larger area rather than just an apartment complex. She explained the rationale for 
this: 
So that when we go away, it's not just about the immediate neighbors, but it's about the 
refugees finding their bearings, knowing where to go with their problems, and finding 
leisure time activities in the area so that they can get along without us. That's why it makes 
a lot of sense for us not to just refer to the two rows of houses. 
 
This demonstrates a long-term plan for self-sufficiency far outliving the three months of 
casework offered in the US. The nature of self-sufficiency is not diluted; the aim is still to become 
independent and resourceful. The timeline, however, is extended in Germany. Susanne described 
self-sufficiency in a similar manner: “In Germany you simply have to be self-reliant and know 
how to help yourself.”  She gave the example of a refugee wanting to start a business. To do so, 
they need a German friend who knows the system and willingly takes time to wade through the 
bureaucracy and help them. In another example, a refugee who applied for allocations to furnish 
their apartment can help another refugee understand the process. The goal is to have such 
relationships already established through the efforts of organizations like the RWO. On the one 
hand, this conception of self-sufficiency as knowledge to self-help correlates to the US focus of 
entrepreneurialism to seek support. Yet it also contrasts with the method of self-help. In Pittsburgh, 
the Bhutanese refugees created their own ethnic organization and relied on social networks and 
charities for support. In Berlin, Syrian refugees are trained to navigate various support systems—
whether governmental safety nets or social relationships with fellow refugees or local citizens—
to thrive. Susanne, for example, describes self-sufficiency not only in terms of finances, but with 
regard to holistic well-being:  
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They have to be introduced to the city. And if they have seen six beautiful places then they 
can tell other refugees about it. That way they can switch off for once, and just be amazed 
and wonder and rejoice. 
 
In sum, the German federal government exerts direct oversight regarding refugee 
settlement. The local organization staff, in turn, exhibits more varied opinions and criticisms of 
the framework. In general, they affirm the importance of language investment and federal checks 
that allow refugees to pursue settlement at their own pace without taking advantage of aid. 
Integration, they maintain, must be rooted in reciprocal relationships between Germans and 
refugees. Towards this end, the RWO facilitated interactions aimed at conversation and culture-
sharing. Together, these efforts emphasize training knowledgeable yet dependent citizens, skilled 
laborers, and multicultural neighbors. 
4.4 Syrian Refugees 
The Syrian refugees I interviewed in Berlin reflect aspects of the ideals promoted by the system 
into which they are resettled. They frequently use the term “integration” and describe the reciprocal 
nature of settlement, for example by suggesting cultural trainings for non-profits or businesses 
hiring refugees. They reproduce the multicultural neighbor figure by desiring language proficiency 
and interactions with German neighbors but not emphasizing citizenship. Maintaining ties to their 
country of origin can, in turn, facilitate swift forced return. Informants complied with the skilled 
laborer and dependent citizen figures, yet exerted resistance by vocalizing criticism of the system, 
suggesting improvements, and rejecting paternalism.  
4.4.1  Laborer 
The interviewed Syrian refugees in Berlin value workforce integration. Most prefer the German 
state’s investment model as opposed to immediate employment. However, they argue for more 
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flexibility regarding work authorization, particularly regarding language requirements and 
recertification.  
Rasha, the Syrian mother of three, arrived in Berlin with her parents, siblings, husband, 
and children and lived in a gymnasium for 14 months. Her father died of illness shortly after they 
moved into an apartment under the RWO’s jurisdiction. Rasha was studying for her A2 language 
exam in 2017 and began the Orientation course after passing the language exam. She additionally 
volunteered her time at the RWO to translate. During quieter hours, staff allowed her to practice 
typing on the computer. When Rasha learned about the American resettlement system, which funds 
refugees for only three months, she vocalized her belief that language is important for an employee 
to understand their task and complete it well: 
That is bad. I think that's bad, so bad. Everything is alien to these people. And if, for 
example, someone understands English and speaks it, then it does not matter, everything 
is fine. But I do not understand English, only Arabic. And then working after three months, 
I will not understand everything. And then maybe the boss is not so good, and he will make 
it harder and scold. And these people cannot speak their opinion. They will just hit or cry 
or say, “what should I do?” and so. I think that's not possible. That is not freedom and also 
not living in safety…I believe asylum is first arriving, and then it is ok to work or 
something. Because we all want to work, not just sit. 
 
Rasha is attesting that individuals do want to work and not merely passively accept federal 
aid. However, she maintains the importance of language acquisition to understand one’s task and 
express oneself. This desire to do one’s work well was echoed by the Bhutanese refugees I 
interviewed as well.  
Other Syrian informants additionally affirm the importance of entering the workforce not 
solely for the sake of financial self-sufficiency, but to show Germans that refugees contribute to 
the country rather than solely take from it. Sayid, the former factory owner, describes that he felt 
good once he began working because he was not just accepting state money. He was “doing 
something useful.” This word choice is significant given an earlier story he had told: while still in 
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the Tempelhof refugee camp, where asylum seekers are housed in the airplane hangars of a former 
airport, his meal schedule was regulated by the kitchen staff. One evening, he missed dinner 
because he had gone out to, in his words, “do something useful.” He asked the cook for his dinner 
upon returning, explaining he had gone out to do something useful. The cook replied, “Who told 
you to do something useful?” Sayid thought: “Oh, so you want me to stay here like a dog and wait 
for my food?” 
 The legitimacy of work was meaningful for Sayid. He felt at home once he started working. 
It allowed him to be a contributing rather than dependent member of society. While the US agency 
staff mentioned that the Iraqi population is difficult to work with because they possessed assets in 
their home country and thus expect too much from the host country, Sayid explained that his 
experience managing a factory and owning a business facilitated his transition to Germany. He felt 
he did not have to integrate because his lifestyle has not changed much. He cannot stop thinking 
like a businessman, which led him to join a startup in Berlin. This organization offers refugee-led 
tours of the city. “If you let someone stand up again, they can become part of the city,” he 
explained. Reciprocating the support Sayid had received from Germany fostered his stake in the 
community:  
I want to say thank you to Germany by doing something useful. We cannot thank Germany 
if we don’t do anything for this lovely city. 
 
To Sayid, working and contributing to society legitimized his stay.  
The refugees I interviewed also offer suggestions for improving the system. Where 
Susanne mentioned that gender roles impact capacity to learn a language, Rasha highlights 
disparities in age:  
We have to understand everything, ask all questions, and so on. But step by step. Not 
everything in a minute. And that's so difficult, too difficult, for old people. The Germans 
do not understand that. For example, my mother has to do the same as I do. I understand a 
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little German and speak, but not my mother. And that causes such pain and the feeling “I 
am a stranger, I cannot live in Germany” and so on. I think if old people have freedom, it 
is better. Only for the young it is ok… [They should take the integration course] only if 
they want. Not so under pressure. Because everyone has long stories and sad stories. It is 
not only “I want to learn.” No. Everyone has a long history and such a hard history. 
 
 As the Bhutanese refugees interviewed expressed the need for organizations to understand 
a specific population’s or individual’s context, Rasha likewise argues that expectations cannot be 
universally applied. She, in particular, addresses the difficulty older refugees have in learning a 
new language. The Bhutanese in Pittsburgh similarly acknowledge the special needs of elderly 
populations and include Senior Programming as a primary focus of the BCG.  
Other Syrians I interviewed urge Germany to dismantle some of its barriers to self-reliance. 
Of the 830,000 asylum applicants Germany has approved, the vast majority depend on government 
welfare benefits and a few more than 100,000 are in full- or part-time employment (Ekren, 2018). 
One challenge is a tightly regulated labor market. Furthermore, the Jobcenter appears to have 
restrictions on the type of work in which a refugee can engage to ensure financial independence. 
Rasha expressed her desire to work as an interpreter, but the Jobcenter said she could not because 
that position pays too little. She must find another job in which she will earn more and not need 
additional aid.  
Another challenge is certification to prove competence for a job. Tarek is a student in his 
mid-20s who earned a scholarship to attend a university in Berlin for a BA focused in politics, 
economics and social thought. In addition to his coursework, he is part of a second refugee tour-
guides startup. He furthermore helped acquire and renovate a building into a community center, 
and built a café on wheels to serve coffee and sweets in front of it. He has also volunteered as an 
interpreter for a Berlin non-profit. Tarek claims the biggest issue in Germany is workforce 
integration: 
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Because everything in Germany is very bureaucratic. If you want to change a plug, you 
need a specialist in it, and you need a certificate saying that you know how to do it…Even 
if you’ve done that for all of your life—thirty, forty years—you need to go back and study 
it from scratch because that is how the system is. And that would be very frustrating and 
discourage a lot of people from going to the integration courses or integrating their 
expertise with the job market. That’s one of the main issues after, you can say, being here 
for a while and learning some of the language. 
 
As Tarek touched upon, the complicated bureaucracy and long wait times can demotivate 
individuals. Refugee informants expressed a desire to show gratitude for Germany through 
working and contributing to society. Yet waiting on their asylum decision for months in makeshift 
refugee camps for a year or more made individuals physically and mentally ill. Sayid describes 
refugees in camps as “wasting away.” Rasha admits that “even now, I am sick from this time. I do 
physiotherapy because I have a lot of stress. And lots of pain.” When an asylum application is 
finally approved, refugees face another year or more of language study, a rigid employment 
training system, and restrictions on changing residence. These regulations can be discouraging and 
make employment seen unattainable. Burhan suggests combining work with language instruction 
in a co-op style system to accelerate workforce integration. Three days of classroom education 
paired with two days of a practicum would allow individuals to formally learn the language in 
addition to practicing conversation with colleagues at work.  
A further barrier to self-sufficiency is lack of economic incentive. Burhan expresses his 
concern regarding German rules that inadvertently demotivate refugees from becoming employed. 
For one, the taxes an individual must pay depends partially on family size. A single man like 
himself, Burhan describes, pays 50% of his salary towards taxes. A married man pays 45%, and a 
family with children may pay 35%. I do not know if the figures Burhan lists are accurate, but they 
illustrate his concern that a single man may receive as much money from the Jobcenter while 
unemployed as he would with his net salary.  
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Furthermore, if a refugee living in a community residence, an accommodation slightly 
more stable than an emergency shelter, finds work, he must begin paying rent for his housing. 
Burhan says he pays a 400 Euro monthly rent for his apartment, but his friend in a community 
residence has to pay 700 Euro for a “single room in a container.” Therefore, refugees typically do 
not begin looking for work until they have moved into their own, more affordable, apartment.  
A similar economic calculation underpins the decision to pursue recertification or 
practicums. As Tarek explains, individuals in a practicum receive poor pay, but their government 
support is still reduced because they are working. Uncoordinated bureaucracy during the transition 
from unemployed to employed status can leave individuals without pay for two to three months. 
If one has a family, Tarek says, that cannot be an option.   
Although the German model appears to invest in education, it can be argued that this system 
is not merely a plan for empowerment. Instead, this model ensures significant government 
regulation. This is evident in the fact that refugees are punished for expressing too much initiative 
or a lack of compliance. For example, refugees must report all money they receive outside of the 
Jobcenter. Consequently, when they inform that they have found a job, their aid decreases. The 
Jobcenter monitors a refugee’s bank and will confront individuals with mysterious deposits. They 
are primarily concerned with refugees working without authorization and thereby pocketing 
Jobcenter money in addition to a black-market salary. Yet for refugees who struggle to learn the 
language and thus cannot earn language certificates or recertify their qualifications, receiving a 
work permit is incredibly difficult. Burhan describes a 60-year-old neighbor and fellow Syrian 
who has 40 years of work experience as an electrical engineer. He has completed 900 hours of the 
language course (the prescribed 600 + an additional 300), and is still at A1, the lowest level. He is 
thus not authorized to work. Working on the black market, for example in an Arab store or 
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restaurant, may be his only labor option. Yet he would be penalized if he did so, and thus stays 
home and accepts Jobcenter aid.  
Individuals who express other forms of non-compliance can also be penalized. Burhan, for 
example, did not like the language school in which he was enrolled. He stopped attending, and 
instead enrolled in another school. For this, he was docked 200 of his 600 course hours. Burhan 
thus received formal education only up to level A2. He learned for the final required level, B1, on 
his own at home.   
This government regulation regarding education and labor is also reflected in a refugee’s 
legal status and expected citizenship.  
4.4.2  Citizen 
The Syrian refugees’ relation to the German government is marked by a precarious status and tight 
regulation. Nearly all Syrian refugees in Berlin have lived in a German refugee camp. These 
emergency shelters were established in any available building, including gymnasiums, airport 
hangers, and conference centers. Sayid says he waited on his residence permit for 10 months and 
did not think he would make it. When a residence permit is granted, it is valid for only one or three 
years. After it expires, the home country situation is reevaluated to determine if the permit should 
be renewed. The permit duration may not be same even within a family, compelling Rasha to urge 
for the standardization of permits: 
I think it is very important for all people get the same residence. Not one family 1 year, 
another family three years. Why so? That's not right. And we are all Arab and come from 
Syria. For example, my mother gets three years and I get one year. Same family, mother 
and daughter…. That's a little scary for me. 
 
Furthermore, this uncertainty can demotivate individuals from engaging in German society 
during the period for which their residence is approved since they may have to pack up and leave 
again. Sayid remarks that his only worry is this three-year period before permanent residence 
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because he is afraid of a closed community. He wants to build one society. When he encounters 
refugees who plan to return to Syria one day, he tells them “not now.” Those who are strong, he 
says, know that no one knows when the war will be over. They will work hard, be useful, and think 
about their future. If they return to Syria one day, they will have to start from zero again.  
A refugee’s relation to the government is also shaped by the federally-mandated 100-hour 
orientation course about German politics, history, and society. It follows completion of the 600-
hour language course. The orientation course duration is three to four weeks, which some refugees 
found rushed. Within this timeframe, they must learn the answers to 310 civics questions, about 
100 a week. Rasha was enrolled in the course in 2017 and describes it as such: 
Yes, it is good. Learning is good. But the orientation course I think is stupid. Too much. 
Only three weeks with three hundred and ten questions, and everything under pressure. 
This is too much. Why? I believe this course should be when someone has lived in 
Germany for four or five years, when they understand everything. And then do this course. 
Not faster, not after just one year or one and a half years. 
 
This flood of courses soon after arrival in Germany seems to have a similar overwhelming 
effect as the early push for employment in the US. Rasha’s suggestion aligns more with the US 
refugee regime, in which refugees with a Green Card can take the citizenship test (100 possible 
civics questions) after five years of residence. A key distinction is that this exam is optional in the 
US—it is only for those who want citizenship. In Germany, completing the orientation course and 
passing the exam are mandated but do not bestow citizenship.  
Citizenship was stated as a goal in only one interview, again highlighting the precarity of 
a refugee’s status and the inability to think as far ahead as naturalization. Sayid, the only refugee 
who did mention it, relates its importance to his experience and the value of voting: 
When you have residence, you can do everything except vote. That is why citizenship is 
important to me. Democracy is living your own life, but also leaving your fingerprint on 
society. You can only do that through voting in a democracy. I lost my city and don’t want 
anyone else to. 
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Tarek, the university student studying economics, politics, and social thought, did not yet 
commit to pursuing citizenship due to an uncertain future:  
I don't want to say yes or no now. Because I've learned the hard way that sometimes you 
cannot push for something that's going to happen to you; you just get yourself to the next 
day and you keep going. So maybe. By the end of my studies here I think my residency 
will be done as well. So at that point I will have a decision between staying and leaving. 
Also by then I will also have all the requirements that the government will ask for an open 
Visa where you can just stay here. And I could also have the requirements to ask for 
citizenship. So at that point those two options will be open. I'm pretty sure I will go with 
one of them because I still need some papers for wherever I go after this. Or if I find a 
program here for a master's degree, I might end up staying here for more years. But I'm 
very open and flexible to other things. When I see an opportunity that works and fits with 
what I want, I go for it, whatever it’s going to be…. Some people just want to forget about 
where they came from because they don't remember anything good, especially if they came 
here very young. And for other people, they can't wait until things get safe and want to go 
back. It's still in my mind. 
 
This precarity in status reveals a fundamental contradiction to the education-investment 
model. Policies that prevent a secure future in Germany yet mandate linguistic and civic training 
contradict at their core. Tarek urges the nation to consolidate its legislation with coherent logic:  
If you’re still pushing the rhetoric that we are going to push people to go back home, some 
of the economic theorists will say that this is a waste of money. Why are we going to give 
all this money and then not use the manpower after this? So that is one of the policy issues. 
Either you lay low on the idea of ‘we're going to push people back’ and you invest in this 
manpower that you have here now and it's going to be a good investment in the long run. 
Or you keep pushing for [return], but in that sense you also need to change your foreign 
policies of how to work with the Syrian government, how to work with other governments 
around Syria, to push for a solution there that you could make it easier for them to go back 
for whenever it is safe enough for them to go back. So it's one policy or the other. You can't 
push for both. That's how I see it. If you are going to fund people to do or learn or whatever 
they are doing here, in the end you want them to work here. Then if they want to go back, 
they can go back, but at a certain point you need to collect the money that you put up. And 
that could happen if you make it easier for them to work as soon as possible. 
 
4.4.3  Neighbor  
The Syrian refugees I interviewed emphasized the importance of language for comprehensive 
independence. As Tarek says, “You cannot be financially stable if you’re not, you can say, socially 
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or psychologically sufficient.” However, they interpret their expected relation to society to include 
a humble lifestyle in addition to linguistic and cultural education.  
First, as “self-sufficiency” was a buzzword for Bhutanese in Pittsburgh, so “integration” 
was a key word among Syrians in Berlin. In the US, self-sufficiency is linked to work and financial 
independence. In Germany, integration is linked to linguistic and civic education. To some degree, 
refugees may have repeated this word as part of learning to speak the language of authority. 
Rasha’s answers highlight this. When asked what “integration” means to her, she replies: 
Integration in life, or in the course? I understand this word as...Germans do not want these 
people to feel strange. It is to always live together, work, speak, make contact. Well, that 
is how I understand that word. It that right? 
 
Later, Rasha says she would feel integrated when she has obtained the C1 language 
certification (one level below heritage speaker). When asked how long she has been in Germany, 
she again ends her reply with a question of affirmation to ensure that her language level matched 
what was expected of her: 
[I have been in Germany] about one and a half years. But I think that what I understand 
now is good, right? 
 
The insecurity she expresses in her answers and request for my affirmation may indicate a 
degree of attempting to mirror particular language or reproduce an answer she believes I expect. 
Beyond fulfilling the figure of an educated, skilled laborer, the interviewed Syrians 
individually declare that German language competency is important for both societal and labor 
integration. Language was perceived as a precursor to respect. Many expressed that newcomers 
must understand the German language and culture in order to respect it and, in turn, earn respect. 
Sayid, the former factory owner, explains: 
Without language, people look at you like a child. They cannot give you value or see your 
experience…. Integration is two-sided. In Germany, many refugees feel like only they are 
being told to change. To have integration, you need language so people can explain their 
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perspective. Before language, it’s not real integration. You can’t just open your mouth and 
shove everything down…. How do you build a bridge community? Know about the culture 
and lifestyle and respect it. When you handle people with respect, no one will deal with 
you in a harsh way. People will respect you even if they don’t love you. When I say I 
respect you, that doesn’t mean I am German. Difference is normal; you have to change 
your mind about how you think about it. 
 
Rasha similarly confirms:  
We have to learn and speak. Not only be with Syrians and Arabs and so on. We must. If 
someone does not understand and then makes chaos or confusion, that will not work. We 
have to understand everything, ask all questions, and so on. But step by step. Not 
everything in a minute. 
 
These recommendations confirm that integration is not assimilation. Sayid maintains that 
refugees should not be compelled to “become German” in culture and lifestyle. Indeed, differences 
are not incompatible with mutual respect. An important factor in regarding one another with 
dignity is language. Communication is vital for effectively sharing one’s perspective, asking 
questions, and understanding situations.  
In addition to a refugee’s responsibility to understand and respect German culture, Sayid 
maintains the need for Germans to reciprocate respect. Such a relationship affirms refugees as 
fellow dignified individuals rather than dehumanizing them as burdens or patronizing them as 
victims. One aspect of respect, dialogue, and genuine welcome involves rejecting paternalistic aid. 
When Germany initially opened its borders in 2015, volunteers responded with the essentials: food, 
water, clothing, shelter. Once the emergency condition has stabilized, though, one must invest in 
sustainable livelihoods. Sayid explains: 
This is my message for the Germans: you can give the refugees enough motivation if you 
give them enough respect. You cannot just be saying ‘welcome’ from a distance. We need 
dialogue…. Help by stop thinking they need help…. Don’t come with food and clothes 
now, one year later. Thousands of organizations do basic help, but there is no deep or 
sustainable help. If you’re an engineer, look for refugees with experience to employ. A 
German doctor can help a refugee doctor. A carpenter can help a carpenter. They have a 
similar connection and can help connect them into their circle. That would make a quick 
integration. 
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Sayid was expressing his frustration with being treated as a victim rather than being 
allowed to take advantage of opportunities that would facilitate self-sufficiency. He also highlights 
the irony of a distant welcome. He feels the iconic images of German citizens greeting refugees at 
the train station with posters, stuffed animals and smiles were not followed by sustainable, long-
term efforts. Two years after the initial arrivals, there must be a plan to move past a perpetual 
emergency state characterized by food and clothing donations. Refugees must be afforded the 
opportunity to become independent of government aid or philanthropy and enter the workforce.  
Another aspect of rejecting paternalism is equipping refugees to understand the system and 
advocate for themselves. Rasha describes her wariness of Germans coming to them without a 
proper introduction of who they are or where they work and yet expect refugees to sign papers and 
enroll in courses. Someone had come to Rasha for enrollment in an integration course even before 
she had received a residence permit. She signed the papers and was enrolled in a private school 
with an ineffective teacher. She wishes that the RWO staff would better protect the refugees or 
give them tips rather than simply letting anyone tell them what to do. Tarek similarly argues that 
the orientation course must integrate practical tips for navigating the bureaucracy rather than 
simply colors of the German flag or the symbol of Berlin: 
For the parents going there, they need to learn about where to send their kids. [The teachers 
need] to advise and them give them tips: this is how the system works, do this this and this, 
these are the options that you have. 
 
Language skills would also combat the isolation of refugee populations. Such exclusion 
was evidenced with Turkish guest workers in the 1960s. Turks are the second largest immigrant 
group in Germany yet rank last in the Berlin Institute’s integration rating. Sayid acknowledges that 
Germany is requiring the language and orientation courses to avoid the mistake they made with 
the guest workers.  
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Interviewees furthermore identify the same challenges RWO staff members mentioned that 
hinder interactions between refugees and their neighbors. When asked why she does not have 
contact with Germans, Rasha explains: 
I do not know. I think everyone has no time maybe. But they are all nice, they do not do 
anything [to] me. But I have no contact. In my apartment building, it is only “good 
morning,” “good morning.” They do not ask, where are you from, or do you need to help 
or something, no. 
 
Burhan says he feels Germans are not scared, but careful. He describes how his street in 
Aleppo was one big family. In Berlin, though, each house has its private life.  
Both Burhan and Rasha further add that they are too shy to approach a German for a 
conversation. Making contact without sufficient language skills to truly communicate or fear of 
being laughed at also creates a stressful situation.  
Another challenge to interactions are presumptions Germans have towards refugees. Sayid, 
the former factory owner, expresses frustration with the media’s portrayal of refugees. News 
stories magnify the vulnerability of refugees, which influences German perceptions: 
The media focused on refugees in camps, where they are not in a good situation. Where 
they cannot work. Where there is fighting among cultures. When you try to interact with 
them, they’ve broken down. Then people say, “they don’t want to be active people.” 
 
Perpetually portraying refugees in a vulnerable state is another aspect of paternalism. On 
the one hand, it evokes savior-complex urges. On the other hand, viewers can interpret these 
images to mean that refugees are lazy or incompetent, occupying space and utilizing federal 
resources while contributing nothing. This would be a false conclusion. When in a refugee camp 
in Germany, asylum seekers are legally not allowed to work, regardless of how much they might 
like to. Even when asylum is granted, refugees have to meet the language requirements described 
above to receive permission to work. A number of other factors, such as mental and physical 
health, also contribute to an individual’s work ability. Sayid now works as a tour guide with a 
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project that offers walking tours of Berlin from the perspective of a refugee. He says he is proud 
of these tours because they help people change their mind and learn not to just get information 
from the media. He feels a part of building a bridge community.   
Again, a refugee’s relationship to the government and federal regulation shapes their 
relation to other aspects of society. Regarding the workforce, refugees must subordinate 
themselves to strict labor regulations. The overly ambitious refugee who wants to be self-sufficient 
before the authorized time is penalized. This dependent refugee figure is enforced by society as 
well: refugees are expected to live a humble lifestyle. Their legitimacy as persecuted individuals 
in need of asylum is questioned when they are seen with smartphones, nice clothes, or a car. 
Giorgio Agamben explains this expected modesty by distinguishing “between zoe (bare life, the 
fact of being alive) and bios (full life, the social presence in the world)” (Fassin 2005:367). This 
separation of zoe and bios is mirrored in the separation of humanitarianism and politics. German 
society supported humanitarian refugee reception on the grounds of moral duty and thus protects 
zoe. Yet the political ideals of universal human rights were not invoked, and thus the flourishing 
of bios is rejected. In his reflection of Agamben’s ideas, Fassin (2005) says, “The refugees thus 
occupy a central place in our moral economy because they reveal the persistence of bare life in 
contemporary societies: deprived from their human rights by lack of citizenship, they can only 
claim to stay alive, most of the time confined in camps settled in countries near the one from which 
they have fled” (367). 
Since the rhetoric of compassion underpins popular support of refugees in Germany, the 
perception of unwarranted bios can quickly cause public outcry. Burhan, for example, interacts 
with refugees through his work. As such, refugees have his phone number and call him all hours 
of the day for help with something. To separate his work and personal life, he found it appropriate 
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to acquire a second phone. His German co-workers likewise have two cellphones. It seems 
standard to have both a work and personal phone; when I began interning at the RWO, the staff 
apologized for not having the funds to offer me a second phone. Yet Germans who see Burhan 
with two phones assume both were paid for with their taxes and that refugees are living a luxurious 
life without working. Burhan describes the justification he feels he has to give to Germans for 
owning two cellphones:  
The German government does everything for these people, but the same time it is wrong 
for the refugees…. For example, I have two cellphones. I bought the new phone and the 
old one belongs to [my employer]. But I did not buy the second phone just like that. Why? 
Because people know my cell phone number and at two or three o'clock in the morning, 
people call me and tell me “Burhan, I have a problem.” I think it is a big problem, and then 
they tell me “No, my WhatsApp does not work.” What can I do? To answer their call I 
hung up on my family. In my home in Syria, in Aleppo, there is no internet anymore. 
Sometimes there is internet and sometimes there is not. If there is no internet, I cannot talk 
to my mother. And sometimes it comes on at two or three o'clock at night. And I wait for 
the phone call of my mother or father. I want to hear my mother and hear my father. But if 
I turn off my phone, I will miss [the call]. Why did I buy the mobile phone? Because if I 
buy a mobile phone for maybe one hundred Euro or so, maybe with taxes, and I need money 
one day, I can sell it for three hundred Euro or four hundred Euro, and the money will come 
back to me. But if I take a cheap one, that's not the case. It is an investment. 
 
Burhan’s perceived need to justify his possessions indicates that while owning assets in 
America deems refugees as successful, in Germany it deems them as freeloading, unjustly 
siphoning resources often perceived to be paid for by German tax dollars.  
Tarek suggests that the combined classroom and work system, like the one Burhan 
proposed, can help combat such sentiment. This compromise furthermore benefits the government 
in the long-run, he argues: 
 For a lot of anti-immigrants, that is the only issue—that they work. “We’re paying for  
them, paying all these taxes for the refugees and they’re not working for us.” Ok, so you  
need to put them to work as soon as possible. And in a couple of years, whatever the  
government paid for them, that is going to come back. When you have all those workers  
coming in, at a certain point it's going to work…. Either you give people more opportunities  
for a job or you don't complain about the refugee program and how much money it is  
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taking. You can have one or the other, it can't be both. 
 
True community is thus not based in subordinating oneself to a particular language or 
culture, or in dependence to the government. Rather, these linguistic and cultural competencies are 
valuable for becoming an independent and respected member of a democratic society. As Tarek 
describes: 
If you’re in a democracy, this is how it should work. People should be able to do whatever 
they want until the point that they are going to hurt other people…. As a lot of Germans 
do. Look at two Germans, and you cannot say that they are close in any way. But they are 
under the same law, under the same government, and they will apply both to the same laws. 
That’s what you could push for. Abide by the laws, do your thing, and keep part of this 
community. Just as any member of this community tries to put something to this 
community. When you do that, you are integrated. 
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5.0 Conclusion  
This thesis contributes to an analysis of refugee subjectivity by considering it as the intersection 
of institutional subjectification and individual agency. This addresses the call Milner and 
Wojnarowicz (2017) set forth: “We must begin to trace linkages between global decision-making 
procedures and local implementation. How are global refugee policies experienced in the lives of 
refugees?” (14). State-mandated and locally-enforced regulations envision a particular future for 
the refugees within their borders. This is manifest through the enforcement of a multi-dimensional 
refugee subjectification. The expectations comprising this subjectification shape the individual 
refugee experience. Refugees thus respond with the agency to reproduce, appropriate, and resist 
such subjectification. The result is a complex refugee subjectivity comprised of both institutional 
and individual expectations. Deconstructing the different dimensions of a multi-faceted refugee 
subjectivity is thus crucial for understanding policy implications on individual lives. Data from 
this ethnography of US and German refugee re/settlement highlight three elements of the 
subjectivity in particular: a refugee’s relation to the state (a citizen figure), to the economy (a 
laborer figure), and to society (a neighbor figure). Refugees do not become one or the other; rather, 
I have explored the type of laborer, citizen and neighbor that is envisioned for refugees by both 
themselves and the federal context in which they live.   
In the United States, emphasis is placed on training refugees to become hardworking, 
self-sufficient laborers in order to be non-demanding citizens and inconspicuous neighbors. This 
was manifest in limited state support. If a refugee fails to achieve self-sufficiency, he must rely 
on his social network or voluntary community assistance. The German case evidences a different 
combination emphasizing a dependent citizen, supported by the skilled laborer and multicultural 
neighbor figures. Refugees rely on the government for fundamental aspects of livelihood. Yet 
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this support is contingent on linguistic and cultural integration. If a refugee demonstrates 
commitment to integration by attending language and orientation courses, he is supported by the 
government and does not need charity.  
Yet ethnographic accounts from time spent with refugees highlight a grave contradiction 
within both the US resettlement and German integration frameworks. The state emphasizes a 
particular dimension of subjectification while creating conditions of precarity or uncertainty 
precisely around that figure. The data evidence that federal policy priorities thereby play a 
significant role in shifting refugee priorities to match the host nation’s ideal. While the refugees 
interviewed resisted or appropriated for their own goals certain expected figures, they still 
mirrored the highest priority figure of the host country. Bhutanese refugees in Pittsburgh 
continually repeat “self-sufficiency,” a word fundamental in the discourse of US refugee 
resettlement representing the financially independent laborer. Syrian refugees in Berlin repeat 
“integration,” the very name of the UNHCR durable solution Germany practices.  
Although the refugee informants in both cities strove to reproduce the primary figure, 
their principal source of precarity flowed from state-mandated barriers to figure actualization. A 
key commonality among Bhutanese refugees in Pittsburgh and Syrian refugees in Berlin is thus 
that the figure with the most uncertainty is the one primarily emphasized by the federal 
re/settlement framework.  This perpetuates chronic liminality, a neither here nor there existence. 
The refugees have been separated from their home government, economy and society, yet are not 
fully integrated into a reaggregated social order in the host country.  
While US policies mandate immediate workforce integration, employment has been the 
most unstable factor of the Bhutanese refugees’ new life. Those interviewed have held multiple 
jobs since arriving, sometimes staying at a job for only days at a time. About half were originally 
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resettled in a different city but moved to Pittsburgh to find job opportunities. Dawa described his 
precarious self-sufficiency as such: 
Now I am independent. But in future I might need help from welfare if I am not  
able to earn money or if I am not able to do the job, I will need help…. It is difficult here.  
The thing is that we have to struggle, we have to work hard. If we don’t do the work,  
we’ll be in a problem. 
 
Authorization to stay in the US, in contrast, is not a source of precarity for them. During 
the 2016 election Dorji explains: 
There are so many news; so many postings on social medias like Facebook, email. I don’t  
think we’ll be having some kind of problem here because whoever comes into the chair  
of president, the Congress is there and sets up the rules and all. We are legal here, we   
came through DHS, I think that is one of the biggest international things of people  
coming and going. They have all the information over there. We are screened and  
everything, so I don’t think we will have problems with that. If we don’t break any laws  
or contracts here, we will be fine. But the other thing is, there are so many histories we  
have read that, when there is one king, and if another comes, he changes some rules. And  
if that is going to happen, it could be, but so far as I am concerned—this is not the old  
days, this is not the age of nineteen forty or nineteen fifty—this is the age of 2K. So,  
everything is clear. Even someone who is gossiping, they have pictures in social media  
because we have pictures everywhere. So, I think we will be safe. We will be safe.  
 
In Germany, however, precarity revolves precisely around permanence in the country. 
Policy mandates that refugees invest in long-term language and civics education. Yet becoming 
part of German society in language and culture is not accompanied by a legal equivalent. 
Refugees have their residence approved for only one to three years at a time, and some fear that 
refugees can be sent back at any point in time.  
This creates a fundamental contradiction: incentivizing refugees to become a particular 
figure without providing them assurance of being that figure for the long-run. States compel 
refugees to strive for the fulfillment of a particular subjectivity without facilitating its 
actualization. Bhutanese in the US are guaranteed permanent status without facilitating social 
and civic integration. Syrian refugees in Germany are equipped with education to facilitate 
 103 
integration but are not guaranteed permanent status.  
Lauren Berlant (2011) calls this “cruel optimism…when something you desire is actually 
an obstacle to your flourishing” (cover). Dima in Pittsburgh expresses this optimism:  
If we work hard, everything is possible here. Everything is in our hands. What we have to  
do is struggle here…. Fulfill first our dreams—so when I complete my study and get a  
nice job and start looking for a house…fulfilling our dreams, then we will feel resettled. 
 
Rasha in Berlin roots her optimism in further education and skills building, mirroring the 
refugee figure prioritized by the German framework: 
I would like to continue education for my children. [For them to] do something,  
vocational training or studying at university. And then me too. My husband in Syria did  
car mechanics work. I also hope he finds this job in Germany. And yes, to work for  
yourself, to earn money yourself. I want to work, as an interpreter hopefully.  
 
This precarity rooted in cruel optimism is bolstered by regulation of mobility. In the US, 
Volags try to resettle refugees in a city in which they already have family and thereby a support 
network, minimizing federal responsibility and magnifying the precarity of self-sufficiency. In 
Germany, refugees lament that their family is scattered all across the country and federal regulation 
bars them from moving. This positions refugees to depend on the government, yet their unstable 
residency makes the relationship fundamentally precarious.  
The contradiction of emphasizing a particular dimension of subjectification while creating 
conditions of precarity precisely around that figure perpetuates the power of conditional refuge. 
Bhutanese refugees are selected for resettlement in the US and expected to become quickly self-
sufficient in return to justify their reception. Syrian refugees in Germany are granted temporary 
residency, which can be renewed if they prove linguistic, civic, and employment success. Such 
conditional refuge raises larger questions around the nature of resettlement and integration and 
indicates that the “durable solutions” proposed by the UNHCR are not, in fact, durable.  
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Given the individual nation’s relative freedom in policy development, this insecurity flows 
from federal agendas. I argue that states intentionally perpetuate conditional refuge to ensure the 
subordination of refugees. This is evident in the fact that national policies in the US and Germany 
do not align with the goal of the durable solution they supposedly enact. One might expect the 
permanent resettlement framework of the US to invest in language and civic education. The 
uncertain future framework in Germany, in contrast, might justify quicker workforce integration 
so refugees can sustain themselves rather than invest in the language and culture of a country they 
may be compelled to leave. These contradictions, however, maintain precarity and sustain an 
“existential condition” (Ramsay 2018:203) of an insecure livelihood in both the present and future. 
In addition to a federally imposed subjectification, the cause of a refugee’s flight may 
impact an individual’s goals for the future and thus their response to expectations. The Bhutanese, 
for example, were exiled from their country. This bitter expulsion stripped them of hope for return 
and compelled them to move forward in a new country. Abhaya explains:  
I feel fully integrated, I feel settled. I feel like [the USA] is my country. Whatever I do, do  
it for this country…before we became citizens, there could be fluctuating in my mind— 
like, maybe we should go back. But there is nowhere for us to go back to. We came in as  
refugees; Bhutan would never ever accept us. I really don’t want to go back to Nepal. So  
where would we go? This is the country… we didn’t look back; we wanted to look forward  
only. So that was the resettlement. We are here to progress. We are here to do something.  
 
The Syrians, in contrast, fled war and persecution. They were not forcefully and 
systematically exiled by law, as the Bhutanese were. As such, for some there is still hope of return 
if regime changes. This preserved longing contributes to the precarity of their permanence in 
Germany as well. As Tarek explains: 
 For a lot of people they have different answers. Some people just want to forget about  
 where they came from because they don't remember anything good, especially if they  
 came here very young. And for other people, they can't wait until things get safe and  
 want to go back. It's still in my mind…Some families who maybe didn't establish  
 yet here or don't feel that they belong, they will go back--especially if they still have  
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 something at home. If they still have a family there or their home is only partially  
 destroyed they can still rebuild it or whatever they’re gonna do. So that will be different  
 every time but that also depends on how things are going back home.  
 
To promote durability and secure livelihoods, I argue the need for a fundamental shift in 
the way policy is designed and implemented. Refugee integration and resettlement are 
components of a two-sided process involving both the migrant and host country. As such, a 
sustainable solution cannot be one that fulfills the envisioned future of the host country alone. 
The primacy of the federal imagination is evidenced in the fact that the same refugee will be 
compelled to become a drastically different citizen, laborer and neighbor in the US than he 
would have in Germany. Refugees are not involved in the process of shaping the vision of their 
own future. To address this fundamental disconnect, refugees must be affirmed as active 
partners, not passive subjects, in resettlement and integration.  
Advancing this research is crucial for understanding how transnational trends such as 
economic globalization and liberalization, humanitarianism, and securitization continue to shape 
national agendas, and thereby federal paradigms for refugee re/settlement and refugee 
subjectification. These case studies contribute to an understanding of the refugee experience 
beyond the border-crossing moment and asylum approval. Further research can expand both the 
depth and breadth of this study. I hope to explore more refugee re/settlement models, such as the 
Canadian private sponsorship program and the Spanish rescue and reception model. To gain a 
better understanding of the complete reception picture, it is also important to study the 
expectations of refugee figures regarding activities such as consumption and political action.  
Ultimately, understanding the on-the-ground implementation of policy-level decisions is 
crucial for developing sustainable frameworks that incorporate both state and refugee priorities. 
Currently, “given the highly institutionalized nature of the making of global refugee policy, only 
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a limited number of actors, namely states belonging to ExCom and UNHCR, participate in this 
process. Other actors, including NGOs and refugees, are not able to participate directly in the 
formal and informal process leading to decisions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee” (Milner 
and Wojnarowicz 2017:13). There is thus great need to engage both the voices of local 
organizations, which implement federal policies, and of refugees, whose daily life is impacted by 
policy implementation. Nation-states must recognize both local communities and refugees as key 
stakeholders in the re/settlement process. This community orientation is vital for informing 
policy creation and implementation, and thereby for the durability of responses to forced 
displacement.  
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